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INTRODUCTION

In enacting the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977 (EAA)' in June of 1977, Congress and the
President, impelled by strong moral and political forces, began an
experiment, the results of which are in large measure still unknown.
The experiment may determine whether it is possible to proscribe
compliance by United States firms and their controlled foreign affiliates with certain aspects of the Arab boycott of Israel,2 without
seriously harming the United States economy or progress toward a
peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The experiment is scheduled to continue, unless there is a comprehensive Middle East peace
settlement, at least until the summer of 1979 when the Export Ad' Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as the EAA] amending the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2401, et seq. (1970) (amended 1974).
I The Arab boycott of Israel has both "primary" and "secondary" elements. The primary
boycott seeks to prevent the importation of Israeli goods or services into Arab countries or
the export of goods or services from Arab countries to Israel. The secondary boycott extends
to third country business firms, seeking to deter them from contributing to Israel's economic
development. Under the secondary boycott, Arab governments or businesses are prohibited
from doing business directly or indirectly with companies which have certain kinds of economic or business relations with Israel, such as: manufacturing or assembly plants in Israel
or licensing arrangements with Israeli companies; prospecting for natural resources in Israel;
or substantial investment in Israeli companies or joint venture partnerships with Israeli
companies. The secondary boycott also has been applied to foreign banks which lend money
for Israeli industrial, military or agricultural projects; insurance companies which participate
in commercial or industrial companies in Israel; and vessels which have routinely called at
Israeli ports.
The secondary boycott is enforced through the maintenance by boycott authorities of a
"blacklist" of business concerns, persons, or vessels believed to have engaged in business
relations with Israel violative of boycott principles. To maintain and enforce this blacklist,
Arab countries routinely require the furnishing of information by firms seeking to qualify to
do business in Arab countries. Further, they require the submission either as a condition of
payment of a letter of credit or as an import documentation requirement, certifications
regarding origin of goods and the blacklist status of supplier, vessel and insurer. Also, Arab
sources not infrequently require foreign business concerns to undertake not to subcontract
with blacklisted firms for products or services needed to carry out contractual obligations.
These latter requirements, sometimes called "tertiary" boycott requests, are a principal (but
by no means exclusive) target of the EAA.
The EAA is not directed at the "primary" boycott requirements of Arab countries but
rather at the "secondary" and "tertiary" requirements. However, subject to a limited grace
period until June 21, 1978, the EAA, prohibits the furnishing of negatively phrased statements
regarding the origin of goods (e.g., "goods not of Israeli origin"). EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(B).
Thus, even though a United States firm may comply with an Arab country's law prohibiting
the import of Israeli goods, EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(A), it may not give a negative certificate
of origin. The provisions of the EAA are summarized in the text accompanying notes 20 to
27 infra.
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ministration Act of 1969 will again be subject to amendment and
extension.3
The success of the experiment initiated by enactment of the EAA
depends upon numerous variables. These variables include, most
importantly: the results of extensive rulemaking responsibilities
vested in the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary);4 the willingness
of the Secretary to administer the EAA antiboycott prohibitions in
a fair and coherent fashion; the willingness of Arab nations enforcing the boycott of Israel to accommodate their boycott practices to
the new strictures of United States law; and finally, the changing
complexion of Middle East politics.
Of these four variables, only the first can presently be isolated and
analyzed with any thoroughness. Some highly speculative comment
can be proffered on the second and third. Discussion of the fourth,
a highly volatile one, is beyond the scope of this modest effort.'
The principal focus of this Article is, therefore, on the regulations
promulgated by the Commerce Department to implement the
EAA's prohibitions and exceptions thereto. In developing these regulations, the Commerce Department has performed in a conscienThe EAA extended the Export Administration Act's authorities until September 30, 1979,
at which time they will lapse unless extended once again. EAA sec. 101.
I The EAA is not self-executing. It requires that its antiboycott prohibitions and exceptions
be implemented by regulations adopted by the Secretary of Commerce [hereinafter referred
to as the Secretary) in accordance with specific deadlines. EAA sec. 201, §§ 4A(a)(1) and
(5). Final implementing Export Administration Regulations [hereinafter cited as EARl were
promulgated as required by the EAA, on January 18, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 3508 (1978) (to be
codified in 15 C.F.R. Part 369). Since these regulations have not yet been codified, and interested persons are accustomed to citing them as EAR § 369.1-.5, this Article will cite just
to the EAR and appropriate section number, followed by a parallel citation to the Federal
Register.
Also beyond the scope of this Article is any significant discussion of the antiboycott
provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 §§ 1061-1064,
I.R.C. 44 908, 952(a), 995(b)(1) and 999 [hereinafter cited as TRA]. In general terms, the
TRA may deprive a United States taxpayer of portions of its otherwise available foreign tax
credits, foreign affiliate income deferral, and DISC income deferral if it or any member of its
controlled group or any 50%-or-more owned affiliated corporation or under certain conditions,
any corporation in which it has a 10% or greater ownership interest, has participated or
cooperated in an international boycott, other than a boycott sanctioned by the United States
in the relevant tax year. Boycott participation or cooperation for this purpose includes agreeing to refrain from doing business with a boycotted country or with blacklisted persons but
excludes agreeing to observe a primary boycott, i.e., agreeing not to ship Israeli-origin products to Arab countries and vice-versa. The TRA provisions add very substantial complexity
to the regulatory environment faced by the United States firms with Middle East business.
They resulted, it can be speculated, from the frustration caused the Congress by the Ford
Administration's unyielding opposition to antiboycott measures in Export Administration
legislation.
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tious fashion while under substantial political pressures.' The resulting Export Administration Regulations (EAR) do much to fulfill
a congressional mandate that, insofar as feasible, the regulations
supply clear guidelines to those regulated.' Nevertheless, as a result
of the intrinsic complexity of the legislation and the need of the
Commerce Department to make hard choices in a highly politicized
context, the EAR contain certain significant gaps and imperfections. This Article will highlight these gaps and imperfections in the
course of attempting to assess the overall impact of the EAA and
the EAR on continued conduct of business by those subject to the
EAA, with and in boycotting countries.
This Article is divided into four additional sections. Section II
reviews very briefly the historical background of the EAA. Section
III summarizes its provisions and discusses its major jurisdictional
criteria as elaborated in the EAR. Section IV discusses in practical
terms the application of the EAA's prohibitions and exceptions to
business relations of firms within the jurisdictional ambit of the
EAA, with and in Arab countries. It also identifies and suggests
remedies for gaps and imperfections in the EAR as they affect these
business operations. Section V offers some highly speculative assessments regarding the likely reaction of Arab nations to the new strictures of United States law and states certain general conclusions
about the overall impact of the EAA on United States business in
the Middle East, in light of these assumptions and in light of the
' After issuing proposed regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,556 (1977), the Commerce Department
received letters from Senators Proxmire (Oct. 24, 1977), Heinz (Nov. 1, 1977) and others
urging amendment to the final regulations to conform them to alleged legislative intent.
These letters are on file in the Freedom of Information Records Inspection Facility of the
Industry and Trade Administration, United States Department of Commerce, see note 18
infra. In addition, hearings were held by the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and
Monetary Affairs of the House Government Operations Committee, chaired by Benjamin
Rosenthal for the ostensible purpose of exercising "oversight" of the actual rulemaking
process. Department of Commerce's Proposed Antiboycott Enforcement and Regulation
Plans: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Since the principal compromises imbedded in the legislation were reached in extra-legislative negotiations
(see note 18 infra and accompanying text), the claims of various members of Congress to
speak authoritatively, after the fact, regarding legislative intent are questionable at best.
The legislative intent in accepting the extra-legislative compromise was to delegate to the
President and the Secretary of Commerce the task of giving specific operational content to
agreed and legislated principles. In that context the "activism" of certain members of Congress during the rulemaking process was unusual, and arguably, inappropriate.
I See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFaS ON S. 69, S.
REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
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character of the administration of the EAA by the Department of
Commerce.
II. BACKGROUND
Enactment of the EAA by the 95th Congress marked the end of
two years of legislative and political controversy on the subject of
antiboycott legislation. The Ford Administration opposed antiboycott legislation on the grounds that adequate legal authority already
existed in the Export Administration Act of 19691 and other federal
statutes to deal with the boycott's most controversial manifestations, that is, discrimination against United States firms with Jewish management,' and refusals by United States firms to do business
with other firms "blacklisted" by boycott authorities,"0 and on the
Since 1965 it has been the declared policy of the United States to "oppose restrictive trade
practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries friendly
to the United States." Further, it has been United States policy, "to encourage and request
domestic concerns [engaged in export transactions] to refuse to take any action, including
the furnishing of information or the signing of agreements, which has the effect of furthering
or supporting [such restricitve trade practices or boycotts]," 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(5) (1970)
(amended 1977). This policy statement and an accompanying requirement that domestic
concerns be required by rules and regulations to report to the Commerce Department receipt
of requests, answers to which would violate the policy, were included in the 1965 Amendments
to the Export Control Act of 1949. Pub. L. No. 89-63, 79 Stat. 209 (1965) (replaced by the
Export Administration Act of 1969). At the same time these antiboycott provisions were
added, the Export Control Act was also amended to allow control of the export of
"information" and it was contemplated by Congress that this authority might be used, at
the discretion of the executive branch taking into account the foreign policy interests of the
United States, to prohibit responses to boycott inquiries. See Reoar OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURIRENCY TO ACcOMPANY H.R. 7105, S. REP. No. 363, 89th Cong. 1st Sess.
8, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODF CONG, & AD. NEWS 1826. Thus, it can be argued that
authority has existed since 1965 for the prohibition of the most common forms of boycott
"compliance" and that the EAA's prohibitions were not necessary, except as a means to
compel action by the executive branch.
The reporting requirements of the Export Control Act of 1965 and of the Export Administration Act of 1969 have been enforced by the Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations found at 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.1-.5 (1977). The EAA continues the requirement
of reporting of requests to further or support restrictive trade practices or boycotts aimed at
friendly countries. EAA sec. 201, § 4A(b)(2).
I In November 1975, the Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations were
amended effective December 1, 1975 to prohibit responding to any boycott request which
"discriminates, or has the effect of discriminating, against U.S. citizens or firms on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 15 C.F.R. § 369.2 (1976).
1*In January 1976 the Department of Justice initiated an antitrust suit against Bechtel
Corporation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), alleging that Bechtel
had, in compliance with the Arab boycott, engaged with other United States firms (its
corporate affiliates) in a concerted refusal to deal with United States firms whose names
appeared on the blacklist maintained by Arab boycott authorities. United States v. Bechtel
Corp., No. C76-99 (GBH) (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976). A consent decree to settle this suit
was proposed in January 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 3716 (1977).
On March 28, 1978, in a pleading filed with respect to the proposed decree, the Department
of Justice took the position that certain conduct permitted by the EAA may, nonetheless,
violate the Sherman Act. 43 Fed, Reg. 12,954 (1978). Most significantly, it is the Justice
Department's position that United States firms may not initiate boycott-based selections of
suppliers of goods for import into a boycotting country, even though such selections are
permitted by the local law compliance exception of the EAA and EAR. See notes 261 to 291
intro and accompanying text for an elaboration of this exception.
If final, revised Commerce Department reporting regulations require reporting of either the
initiation or receipt of such selections, the task of would-be federal or private antitrust
litigants will be substantially facilitated,
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grounds that any new legislation could have a serious deleterious
impact on United States economic and diplomatic goals in the Middle East." Administration witnesses argued that the legislation
could be viewed by Arab nations as an affront to their sovereignty
and that it could substantially handicap United States firms seeking expanded business opportunities in oil-rich Arab markets. Infringing Arab sovereignty and handicapping United States firms
seeking to build business relationships, it was felt, would undercut
the United States' ability to be an effective mediator, enjoying the
confidence of Arabs as well as Israelis, in the efforts to obtain permanent peace in the Middle East."
While the debate between the executive and legislative branches
on the subject of antiboycott legislation ran its course during 19751976, the business community did not vigorously participate though
it remained a very interested spectator. Since the executive branch
was opposing new antiboycott legislation, the business community
probably thought it had little to gain by taking a strong public
position on an issue of such political sensitivity.
Legislative efforts in the 94th Congress foundered when parliamentary maneuvers in the closing days of the Congress blocked
appointment of Senate Conferees to a House-Senate Conference on
Export Administration Act extension legislation containing antiboycott provisions." An "informal" House-Senate Conference did
convene, however, and produced a text of boycott provisions which
subsequently became the focal point for legislative action in the
95th Congress.
Inevitably the antiboycott policy of the United States became an
issue in the 1976 presidential campaign. Candidate Carter endorsed
stringent antiboycott legislation, apparently based upon the common misapprehension that the Arab boycott was essentially a disSee Effectiveness of FederalAgencies Enforcement of Laws and PoliciesAgainst Compliance, by Banks and Other US. Firms, with the Arab Boycott (Part2-Department of Commerce Boycott Disclosure Program) Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and
Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4
(1976) (statement of Secretary of Commerce, Elliot L. Richardson) [hereinafter cited as the
Rosenthal Hearings].
"1 The positions of the executive and legislative participants in the extended debate have
been lucidly summarized by Professor Steiner. See Steiner, InternationalBoycotts and Domestic Order:American Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 54 Tax. L. REv. 1355, 138090 (1976).
"1 The bills sent to Conference were S. 3084, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), and H.R. 15377,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
1 122 CONG. R.c. H12313-15 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976).
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criminatory boycott directed against Jewish Americans and United
States firms with Jewish management." President Ford ordered
prospective public disclosure of reports of boycott requests filed by
United States companies with the Department of Commerce" but
did not publicly espouse new legislation. 7
The election of President Carter made enactment of new antiboycott legislation a virtual certainty and impressed upon the business
community the need to become more actively involved in the legislative process on this issue. There resulted an unusual, extralegislative negotiation between representatives of the Business
Roundtable (an association of 190 executives of major American
corporations) and of the three major Jewish service organizations,
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish
Committee, and the American Jewish Congress. Lawyers for both
sides conducted extensive negotiations in the winter and spring of
1977 and forged a compromise legislative text which each side was
willing to support. Their compromise provisions were introduced as
amendments to Export Administration extension legislation on the
floor of the Senate" and later became law.
' Much of the legislative impetus in the 94th Congress was the result of widespread belief
by citizens and legislators that the Arab boycott was essentially discriminatory in nature,
imbued with discriminatory animus against firms with Jewish officers or directors. Boycotting governments and their officials have steadfastly denied this charge. Reports of boycott
requests filed at the Department of Commerce, and since October 7, 1976, routinely made
public, disclose that boycott requests manifesting racial or religious discrimination are extremely rare, and that the Arab boycott of Israel has become in large part what it purports
to be-an economic boycott. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that misconceptions about the
boycott have the potential to cause "chilling" effects on business opportunities for Jewish
owned or managed firms and that in some cases this potential has in all probability been
realized.
e The President's directive was accomplished by amendment to the Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations effective October 7, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 44,861
(1976).
" In the final week of the 94th Congress, the White House circulated to certain members
of the "informal" House-Senate Conference, and to representatives of major Jewish organizations, a proposed compromise text. See Rosenthal Hearings, supra note 11, at 4, 45-46. It was
too little and too late. It was similar to the Senate version of legislation, S. 3084, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976) (the so-called Stevenson bill), but would have required proof of an actual
agreement to sustain a charge that a United States person had engaged in a "refusal to deal."
As such it was narrower in scope than either the House or Senate bills and therefore, as a
parliamentary matter, subject to point-of-order challenge if it had been approved by conference committee. It is this proposal to which Presidert Ford referred during the second CarterFord debate when he stated that his administration had sought legislation which would take
strong and effective action against those who participate in or cooperate with the Arab
boycott. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1976, § A, at 19, col. 1.
1 123 CONG. REC. S7152-54 (daily ed. May 5, 1977) (remarks of Senator Heinz). The
fragility of the compromise was demonstrated by the widely divergent points of view ex-
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The fact that a major business association played a central role
in framing the legislative compromise does not mean, however, that
the resulting legislation does not present substantial obstacles to
business relations with countries engaged in the boycott of Israel. 9
III.

SUMMARY OF THE ANTIBOYCOTr

PROVISIONS OF THE

EAA

The EAA imposes substantial criminal and civil penalties 0 on
certain conduct of "United States persons" in United States interstate or foreign commerce, undertaken with intent to comply with,
further or support any boycott, unsanctioned by United States law
or regulation, and directed against "a country which is friendly to
2
the United States." 1
A.

Prohibitionsand Exceptions

The EAA's prohibitions are directed to the perceived, principal
manifestations of the boycott: its emphasis on the furnishing of
certifications and answers to questionnaires to Arab authorities,
pressed in comments submitted by the Business Roundtable on the one hand and the major
Jewish organizations on the other, to the Commerce Department in response to the Department's requests for comments on proposed regulations to implement the EAA's prohibitions.
Compare Submission of the Business Roundtable dated November 18, 1977 with that of the
American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith, dated November 18, 1977. (Both Submissions are on file in the
Freedom of Information Records Inspection Facility of the Industry and Trade Administration, Room 3012, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230.)
" The boycott is known to be enforced by Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and the Yemens. The
TRA requires that a public listing of boycotting countries be made quarterly by the Department of Treasury; this listing is made up of the aforementioned countries. I.R.C. § 999 (a)(3).
See 42 Fed. Reg. 17,560 (1977).
2 Knowing violations of the EAA are subject to a criminal fine of $25,000 and one year's
imprisonment. Second and subsequent knowing violations are subject to a $50,000 fine, or a
fine of three times the value of any exports involved, and five years imprisonment. EAA sec.
112 (amending § 6(a) of the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)).
Violations are also subject to civil and administrative penalties. Each violation may occasion
a fine of $10,000, and a person's export privileges may be suspended or revoked. EAA sec.
203(a) (amending § 6(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2 405(c)).
Although administration of the Export Administration Act is normally exempt from the
Administrative Procedure Act, civil and administrative sanctions imposed pursuant to the
EAA must follow notice and opportunity for an on-the-record hearing in accordance with 5
U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1970). Id.
21 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1). While by its terms the EAA applies to all foreign boycotts
against countries friendly to the United States, in fact, the legislation has been crafted to
deal with the Arab boycott of Israel. In the foreseeable future it is likely that the Commerce
Department will devote almost the totality of its available boycott-enforcement resources to
deal with problems arising from the Arab boycott of Israel. Nevertheless, United States
persons remain liable for violations of the EAA vis-a-vis other international boycotts.

19781

BUSINESS EFFECTS-ANTIBOYCOTT LEGISLATION

either directly or as a condition of payment of a letter of credit; its
attempt to condition Arab business on a requirement that United
States companies not do business with Israel or other United States
companies doing business with Israel; and its overemphasized discriminatory animus against Jewish Americans.
Consequently, subject to certain carefully limited exceptions, the
EAA prohibits doing or agreeing to do the following: (1) refusing or
requiring anyone else to refuse to do business with or in a boycotted
country, with any national, resident or business concern of the boycotted country or with any other person, pursuant to an agreement
with, requirement of, request from or on behalf of a boycotting
country; (2) discriminating against United States persons on the
basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin; (3) furnishing information regarding the race, religion, sex, or national origin of any
United States person; (4) furnishing information about anyone's
past, present, or future business relationships with a boycotted
country, its nationals or residents, including any business concern
organized under its laws, or with any other person known or believed
to be blacklisted; (5) furnishing information about charitable or
fraternal involvements; and (6) implementing any letter of credit
which conditions payment upon the performance of any prohibited
boycott action.2" In addition, the EAA contains a broadly-phrased
prohibition against any action undertaken directly or through another person, with the intent to evade the application of its provi-

sions .2
These prohibitions are subject to certain exceptions designed to
permit compliance with "primary" boycott practices and to accommodate legitimate exercise of sovereign rights by Arab states within
their own territories. Accordingly, the EAA's exceptions allow compliance or agreement to comply with: (1) requirements of a boycotting country barring the importation of goods or services of a boycotted country, its residents, nationals or business concerns; (2) requirements barring the use of carriers of a boycotted country or
carriers which do not follow prescribed routings so as to avoid stopping in ports of a boycotted country prior to disembarkation at an
Arab port; (3) import and shipping document requirements with
respect to the country of origin, name of the carrier, route of shipment, and identity of the supplier, so long as this information is
n Id. § 4A(a)(1)(A)-(F).

Id. § 4A(a)(6).
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provided in affirmative, non-blacklisting, non-exclusionary terms;
(4) unilateral and specific selections by a boycotting country or a
national or resident thereof, of carriers, insurers, suppliers of services to be performed within the boycotting country or specific goods
identifiable by source when imported into the boycotting country;
(5) export requirements of a boycotting country regarding shipment
or transshipment of goods to a boycotted country; (6) immigration,
passport or employment information requirements, provided the
information is furnished by an individual for himself or for his immediate family; and (7) laws of the boycotting country as they apply
to a United States person resident therein with regard to activities
of that person exclusively in the boycotting country or to importation of identifiable products for that person's own use in the boycotting country.2 4
To allow an orderly and fair adjustment to the new prohibitions
by United States companies and, presumably by Arab clients and
customers as well, the EAA provides a "grace period" through December 31, 1978 for actions taken pursuant to a written contract or
other agreement entered into before May 16, 1977.25 This period may
be extended for an additional year on a case-by-case basis if the
Secretary finds that good faith efforts are being made to renegotiate
the contract to eliminate the offending provisions.28 A "mini" grace
period was provided, in addition, to allow continued furnishing of
negative certificates of origin and blacklist status of supplier, vessel,
and insurer through June 21, 1978.2
The EAA's prohibitions and exceptions, as amplified in the EAR
promulgated by the Secretary, will be discussed further in evaluating the business effects of the EAA. Special emphasis will be placed
on the four most significant prohibitions: those dealing with refusals
to do business, furnishing of information about business relationships, implementing letters of credit containing prohibited conditions, and evasion. Similarly, prominence in any discussion of business effects of antiboycott legislation must be given to three of the
six exceptions: those relating to compliance with import and shipping document requirements, compliance with boycott-based unilateral and specific selections of suppliers of goods or services, and
compliance with local laws of boycotting countries.
Id. § 4A(a)(2)(A)-(F).

"Id. § 4A(a)(5).
"Id.
"

Id. §§ 4A(a)(2)(B) and 4A(a)(5).
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Before analyzing the potential business effects of the EAA's prohibitions, however, it is appropriate to review in some considerable
depth its jurisdictional foundations, namely the definitions of
"United States person," United States commerce, and "intent."
B.

"United States Person" and United States Commerce

The EAA and EAR define "United States person" to include all
individuals who are residents or nationals of the United States; any
government of a United States jurisdiction or its departments and
agencies; and all corporations, partnerships or other form of association organized under the law of any United States jurisdiction. Further, it includes United States branch offices and subsidiaries of
"foreign concerns." Finally, and significantly, it embraces all
"controlled in fact" foreign branches and subsidiaries of "domestic
concerns." 28
The EAA leaves to the executive branch the task of defining by
regulation the criteria for the existence of control in fact.2" According
to the EAR, such control exists when a domestic concern 30 has the
authority or ability "to establish the general policies or to control
the day-to-day operations" of its foreign subsidiary or branch. 31
However, a foreign branch office of a domestic concern is deemed
to be controlled in fact by the domestic concern under all circumstances.32 A rebuttable presumption of control in fact arises when
the domestic concern: (1) owns or controls more than 50% of the
voting securities of the foreign affiliate; (2) owns or controls 25% or
more of the voting securities, and this interest is not matched or
exceeded by that of any other person; (3) operates the foreign affiliate pursuant to an exclusive management contract; (4) has members of its board of directors filling a majority of the positions on the
EAA sec. 204 (amending § 11 of the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2410); EAR § 369.1(b), 43 Fed. Reg. 3512-13 (1978).
29 EAA sec. 204 (amending § 11 of the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2410).
" "Domestic concern" is a term that has appeared in United States law pertaining to the
Arab boycott of Israel, since 1965. See discussion at note 8 supra. Nevertheless, it has never
been statutorily defined. The EAR define it to mean any business entity organized under the
laws of any United States jurisdiction or any "permanent domestic establishment of a foreign
concern." EAR § 369.1(b)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3513 (1978). This definition excludes individuals
and therefore, it is clear that stock ownership by individuals in foreign corporations will not
under any circumstances constitute control in fact, making such foreign corporations "United
States persons" for purposes of the EAA.
11EAR § 369.1(c)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3513 (1978).
32 EAR § 369.1(c)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 3513 (1978).
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foreign affiliate's board; (5) can appoint a majority of the members

of the foreign affiliate's board; or (6) can appoint the chief operating
officer of the foreign affiliate. 3
The EAR nowhere state that these six presumptive tests are exclusive. Thus, the Commerce Department may find the presence of
control in fact in instances where power to establish the general
policies of the foreign affiliate or to control its day-to-day operations
exists, despite the fact that none of the presumptive tests apply.34
The fact that a foreign concern has a United States affiliate or
branch does not make it a United States person.3 However, a
United States branch or affiliate of a foreign concern is deemed to
be a domestic concern, and any foreign affiliate or branch controlled
by it will be deemed to be a "United States person."
The treatment by the EAA and EAR of a United States branch
of a foreign concern as a separate juridical entity extends also to the
treatment of foreign branches of domestic concerns. While, as already noted, a domestic concern's foreign branch will always be
considered to be controlled in fact, and therefore a United States
person subject to the EAA's prohibitions, it is treated as a separate
3
entity for purposes of the EAA and EAR. 1

The prohibitions of the EAA apply to the foregoing classes of
' EAR § 369.1(c)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3513 (1978). The percentage ownership tests may exempt
from the EAR's purview 50-50 joint ventures between United States firms and foreign entities unless the United States venture partner can appoint the venture's chief operating officer or a board majority, or otherwise can establish the venture's general policies or control
its day-to-day operations.
" The Preamble to the EAR states that power to appoint a board majority is equivalent
to the power to establish general policies for a foreign affiliate, and that power to appoint
the chief operating officer equates to the power to control day-to-day operations. However, it
also states that no presumptions exist regarding the absence of control. 43 Fed. Reg. 3508
(1978).
' EAR § 369.1(b), Example (iii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3513 (1978). The EAR imply, however, that
if the board of directors of a United States corporate affiliate of a foreign concern also makes
up a majority of the board of the foreign concern, then the foreign concern will be presumed
to be controlled in fact by the domestic concern. EAR § 369.1(c)(2)(iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3513
(1978). It seems doubtful that the EAR intend this result and a more sensible reading of this
subsection is that it only applies when there is a domestic concern parent and a foreign
subsidiary.
3 A branch may become a bona fide resident of a boycotting country and direct boycottbased unilateral and specific selections of suppliers of goods to the United States offices of
the same company. EAR § 369.3(c), Boycotting Country Buyer, Example (iii), 43 Fed. Reg.
3529 (1978). Also, foreign branches of United States banks are subject to separate and distinct
presumptive tests regarding the presence of United States commerce for purposes of the
EAA's prohibition against implementing certain letters of credit. See EAR § 369.2(f) passim,
43 Fed. Reg. 3523-24 (1978).
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United States persons only with respect to their activities in the
"interstate or foreign commerce of the United States." The Department of Commerce has also had relatively broad latitude in defining
"interstate or foreign commerce of the United States. ' 37 Under the
EAR, any transactions involving the direct export or sale of goods
or services, including information, from the United States to any
foreign purchaser will be in United States commerce." The action
of a domestic concern in specifically directing the activities of its
foreign affiliate or branch is an activity in United States commerce,
but will not bring a transaction of the foreign affiliate, not otherwise
3 9
in United States commerce into United States commerce.
More interesting and significant is the EAR's application of the
United States commerce standard to the activities of foreign
branches and affiliates of domestic concerns. Any transaction involving United States origin goods or services, including information, will be in United States commerce, if the goods or services are
acquired from a person in the United States for the purpose of
engaging in any specific transaction, including filling the anticipated needs of specified customers. 0 Goods acquired from a person
in the United States remain in United States commerce, whether
or not they "come to rest" in inventory outside the United States,
until they are "further manufactured, incorporated into, refined
into or reprocessed into another product."'" However, goods ordered
from the United States with reference to'a specific transaction with
a boycotting country, or in anticipation of specific orders from a
boycotting country, remain in United States commerce irrespective
of alteration or modification by manufacture or processing outside
42
the United States.
Services acquired from a person in the United States, by a foreign
branch or affiliate of a domestic concern, will not cause a transaction involving their subsequent disposition by the branch or affiliate
to be in United States commerce, if the services were acquired without reference to a specific transaction.43 For instance, manufacture
abroad by a controlled in fact subsidiary of goods for Middle East37 The Congress clearly intended the executive branch to elaborate the United States
commerce standard in regulations. See the SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 37.
EAR § 369.1(d)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3514 (1978).
Id. and EAR Preamble, '43 Fed. Reg. 3509 (1978).
,0 EAR § 369.1(d)(8)-(9), 43 Fed. Reg. 3514-15 (1978).
1 EAR § 369.1(d)(12), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978).
,2 EAR § 369.1(d)(8)(ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3514 (1978).
43 EAR § 369.1(d)(13)(i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978).
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ern markets pursuant to a license agreement with the United States
parent does not cause sale of those goods to be in United States
commerce." Thus, in contrast to their treatment of goods of United
States origin, the EAR consider services which have "come to rest"
outside the United States to be outside United States commerce.
The EAR, however, contain an unfortunate ambiguity at this
point. Whereas they generally treat "information" as part of services by placing a parenthetical "including information" after the
term "services," the EAR omit this parenthetical when discussing
the circumstances under which United States-origin services are not
in United States commerce.45 If information is to be treated differently from services in this regard, the consequences are substantial.
Boycott information questionnaires or other inquiries from boycotting countries are often directed to United States persons' overseas
branches or affiliates, incident to aspects of doing business with
boycotting countries not otherwise involving United States-origin
goods or services and therefore not in United States commerce.
Foreign branches or affiliates of domestic concerns should be able
to respond to such inquiries, without specific recourse to the domestic concern's parent, without the risk that the transaction will
be deemed to be in United States commerce because some of the
information provided originally came from the United States. Also,
domestic concerns' foreign branches or subsidiaries should be able
to respond to boycott information requests received incident to the
registration of patents or trademarks in boycotting countries without their action being in United States commerce simply because
some of the information involved originally came from the United
States.
. Services which the EAR deem to be "ancillary," provided by a
person in the United States to a foreign affiliate or branch of a
domestic concern will not, by themselves, cause a transaction to be
in United States commerce. Ancillary services include legal, accounting, financial and transportation services which are rendered
to the foreign affiliate or branch primarily for its own use rather
than the use of a third party customer or client. In contrast, services
such as those provided by architects or engineers in the United
States, are deemed to "pass through" to the foreign client, bringing
a transaction into United States commerce."
EAR § 369.1(d) Example (xx), 43 Fed. Reg. 3516 (1978).
, Compare EAR § 369.1(d)(11) with EAR § 369.1(d)(13), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978).
, EAR § 369.1(d)(14)-(15), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978).
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If any "non-ancillary" part of a transaction between a domestic
concern's foreign affiliate or branch and a person outside the United
States is in United States commerce, then the entire transaction
will be considered to be in commerce." Thus, if a domestic concern
on behalf of its foreign affiliate gives a guarantee of performance to
a foreign customer, the entire transaction will be in United States
commerce.'" Since a branch generally is without legal capacity to
contract on its own account, it is possible that United States commerce may be deemed to exist in all transactions engaged in by a
foreign branch of a domestic concern. The Commerce Department
may view all such transactions to be guaranteed by the domestic
concern parent.
If this, indeed, is the intended effect of the regulations, it moots
the separate legal status given foreign branches by the EAR's definition of United States person."9 Not only will branches always be
deemed to be controlled in fact and therefore United States persons, 0 but also their contractual commitments may be deemed to
be in United States commerce and subject to the EAA's prohibitions.5 The Commerce Department, although aware of this issue,
has not yet offered any clarification.
Or the whole, with the important exceptions of the ambiguities
that attend branch transactions and the furnishing of information
by controlled in fact foreign affiliates, the jurisdictional compass
given the EAA's prohibitions by the EAR appears sensible and
workable. Contrary to general belief, it does not differ radically from
the jurisdictional scope given by the Commerce Department to its
Arab boycott request reporting requirements in effect since 1965.52
47EAR § 369.1(d)(10), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978).
A-EAR § 369.1(d)(15), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978). The EAR make clear that the provision
of a performance guarantee by a domestic concern parent of a foreign subsidiary to a third
country purchaser, in contrast to the provision of general financial assistance to the foreign
subsidiary, is not an ancillary service and therefore creates a United States commerce nexus.
, See discussion at note 36 supra and accompanying text.
See text at note 32 supra.
" The same analysis does not apply, however, to foreign branches of United States banks
implementing letters of credit. See notes 199 to 200 infra and accompanying text.
52 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.1-.5 (1977). See discussion at note 4 supra. Prior to amendment by the
EAA, the Export Administration Act stated that it was the policy of the United States "to
encourage and request domestic concerns engaged in the export of articles, materials, supplies, or information, to refuse to take any action" which would further or support a boycott
contravening United States policy. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(5)(B) (1970). The reporting requirements implementing this policy of discouragement were to apply to all "domestic concerns,"
50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b) (1970).
The EAA amends the policy statement to substitute the term "United States person" for
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The Commerce Department has stated that these requirements
applied to all transactions involving exports from the United States,
whether pursuant to an order received by a domestic concern or its
foreign subsidiary. 3 On the other hand, the previous reporting requirements, in contrast to the new prohibitions, did not apply to
transactions of foreign subsidiaries involving United States goods
that had come to rest in inventory abroad." Nor was their application to operations of American concerns in boycotting countries or
to the provision of services and "export" of information clearly
spelled out in Commerce Department regulations or other sources
of guidance.
Whatever the reach of prior law, the EAA and EAR greatly clarify
the jurisdictional scope of boycott-related provisions of the Export
Administration Act. They apply them unequivocally, when United
States commerce is present, to foreign affiliates that are controlled
in fact by domestic concerns and to operations of United States
firms within boycotting countries. They are explicit with respect to
the conditions under which provision of services from the United
States will cause a transaction abroad to be in United States commerce. Most significantly, they decline to break the chain of United
States commerce for goods which have come to rest in inventory

abroad .15
C.

Intent

Before conduct will violate the prohibitions of the EAA it must
be undertaken with intent to comply with, further or support an
unsanctioned boycott.5 ' The EAR provide that the requisite intent
domestic concern but retains its language indicating the need for an export transaction nexus.
Thus, it states in pertinent part that it is the policy of the United States, "to encourage and,
in specified cases, to require United States persons engaged in the export of articles, materials, supplies or information to refuse to take [any] actions [which would constitute prohibited boycott compliance]." EAA sec. 202(b) (amending § 3(5)(B) of the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(5)(B) (1970) (emphasis added)). This policy statement
is the predicate for both the prohibitions and reporting regulations under the EAA. EAA sec.
201(a), § 4A(a)(1), §§ 4A(b)(1) and (2). The Secretary of Commerce does not, however,
appear to have felt constrained by the export-related language of this policy statement in
posing tests for United States commerce. See EAR § 369.1(d), 43 Fed. Reg. 3514-15 (1978).
- Letter from Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Richardson to Congressman John Moss
(July 26, 1976), a copy of which is on file at the office of the GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
5 Id.
" See discussion at notes 29-33 and notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text. In contrast
to the EAA, the TRA's boycott-related provisions apply regardless of whether there exists a
nexus with United States commerce.
56 EAA sec. 201(a), § 4A(a)(1); EAR § 369.1(e)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3516 (1978).

19781

BUSINESS EFFECTS-ANTIBOYCOTT LEGISLATION

will be present whenever boycott information is knowingly furnished
in response to a request. Boycott compliance need not be the sole
or even the principal reason for an action for there to exist culpable
intent, so long as boycott compliance is at least one of the reasons
for a person's action. 7
The EAR's general definition of intent does not appear to pertain
to violation of the statutory evasion standard which proscribes actions taken with "intent to evade" the provisions of the EAA and
EAR. 8 An action, such as an alteration of one's business structure
undertaken for legitimate business reasons, in addition to a desire
to avoid the application of the EAA's prohibitions, will not constitute evasion.59
The Commerce Department has resisted repeated suggestions
that it list the Arab boycott of Israel (and the participants therein)
as the sole boycott against a "country friendly to tile United
States," intentional compliance with which will violate the EAA's
prohibitions. 0 The reason for the Department's reluctance to take
this sensible step is not known. It may be that it fears political
criticism if such a step were taken. At any rate it is believed that
the Arab boycott of Israel is the only "secondary" international
boycott currently being enforced and it is clear that the EAA aims
at prohibiting secondary and not primary boycott compliance.,, The
only exception to the focus on secondary boycott practices is the
prohibition in the EAR against negative certificates of product origin .62 Unless or until the Commerce Department announces that the
Arab boycott is the sole boycott subject to the EAR, it will remain
a difficult question whether, for instance, furnishing a negative certificate of origin to an African country stating that goods do not
originate in South Africa, will constitute intentional, prohibited
boycott compliance. Unfortunately, the Department remains opposed to issuing such a notice. In fact, an official of the Department,
on February 27, 1978 has specifically, publicly, beseeched the business community to bear in mind that there are numerous boycotts
throughout the world against nations friendly to the United States,
EAR § 369.1(e)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3516 (1978).
5 EAA sec. 201(a), § 4A(a)(6).
5,EAR § 369.4(e) and § 369.4, Example (vii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
The TRA, I.R.C. § 999(a)(3), requires such a listing. The Treasury has published it as
part of its Guidelines on the Tax Reform Act's boycott provisions. See note 19 supra.
" See REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMrrrEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON H.R. 5840, H. REP.
No. 190, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 5, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1138.
62 EAR § 369.3(b)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
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which may require action that would violate the EAA.63 This Article
will, caveats of the Commerce Department notwithstanding, maintain its focus on the principal objective of the EAA's experiment-the Arab boycott of Israel.
IV.

IMPACT OF THE

EAA AND EAR ON

BUSINESS WITH AND IN THE ARAB

WORLD

This section will analyze the impact of the EAA and EAR on
business with and in boycotting countries. There are two major
subsections. The first deals with export transactions of United
States companies and their controlled foreign branches or subsidiaries outside boycotting countries. The second examines the special
benefits provided to and problems encountered by United States
persons with operations in boycotting countries. These subsections
reflect the major categories of business relationships between
United States concerns and Arab nations and nationals.
The analysis in each subsection includes a background discussion
of manifestations of the boycott encountered by firms doing business with or in Arab nations, prior to the effective date of the EAA
and EAR, January 18, 1978.4 This discussion is followed by a description of what the EAA and EAR will permit United States concerns to do in response to boycott requirements imposed upon them,
delineating those gaps and imperfections in the EAR which compound the difficulty faced by United States concerns seeking to
maintain or develop business relations with Arab countries while
complying with the EAA.
It is a thesis of this Article that imprecisions in the EAR adversely
affect business relations with boycotting countries. Such imprecisions can be interpreted to the detriment of United States concerns
by government officials or can simply discourage certain business
practices otherwise permitted by the EAA. More importantly, ambiguities in the EAR make it difficult to have the United States
antiboycott law treated seriously by Arab governments and boycott
offices. United States government officials and businessmen seeking
to convince Arab nations to relax their boycott laws will be handicapped if certain anomalies and imperfections in the EAA and EAR
are left uncorrected. Accordingly, this Article seeks to emphasize
S3 Interview with Stanley J. Marcuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade
Regulation, Questions and Answers on a Subject of Prime Business Interest, INT'L TRADE Exp.
WEEKLY (BNA) No. 196, M-1 (Feb. 28, 1978).
, See note 4 supra.
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such anomalies and imperfections suggesting clarifications and
amendments to the EAR where appropriate.
This section does not attempt a comprehensive assessment of the
extent to which United States business prospects in the Middle East
may be damaged by the EAA. Any such assessment must include
predictions of the Arab response to the EAA and EAR. This section
outlines the effects of the EAA and EAR on the ability of United
States concerns to comply with typical Arab boycott requirements.
Section V of this Article contains some highly speculative predictions regarding the Arab response to the EAA and EAR and taking
these predictions into -account, makes certain "summary assessments" of the likely effects of the EAA and EAR on United States
business prospects in the Middle East.
A.

Export Transactions
1. Effects of Arab Boycott

Prior to January 18, 1978, United States business exported billions of dollars of goods and services to the Arab world. 5 Almost
without exception these transactions involved some boycott-related
activities on the part of United States concerns."6 The most common
boycott-related activities included (a) furnishing information in response to requests contained in purchase orders or letters of credit
or in anticipation of the demands of customs officials in Arab nations, (b) entering into boycott-related agreements regarding business relations with Israel or blacklisted firms pursuant to conditions
contained in export sales contracts or bid and tender documents, (c)
selecting suppliers, freight forwarders, carriers or insurers as a result
of boycott-based agreements or fear of confiscation of nonconforming goods by Arab customs officials, (d) responding to general questionnaires regarding business relations, and (e) implementing letters of credit containing boycott-related conditions and requirements.67 In addition, a number of these transactions may have involved a diversion of Arab business to foreign entities to avoid direct
compliance by United States concerns with the boycott.
The information commonly requested by Arab nations varied
"

SUBCOMM.

ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
2D SEsS., REPORT ON THE ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN

FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG.,

BUSINESS 29 (Subcomm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN BUSINESS].
*I [d. at ix, 7-8, 31-32.
67 See note 2 supra.
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somewhat depending upon the country requesting the information."
Hard-line Arab countries such as Kuwait demanded certifications
by the exporter that (a) the exporter and its affiliates were not on
the Arab blacklist, (b) the exporter would not use blacklisted insurers, (c) the goods or services to be imported would not be transported via Israel or on blacklisted carriers, (d) the goods to be imported would not be of Israeli origin (the so-called negative certificate of origin), and (e) the goods to be imported were not supplied
by blacklisted companies." More moderate countries such as Saudi
Arabia typically requested a certification from the exporter covering
items (b) through (e) above.70 Finally, some Arab states such as
Egypt often requested only a certification that the import was not
of Israeli origin and that the carrier was not blacklisted.
The boycott-related agreements frequently requested by Arab
customers as part of large export transactions, sought contractual
assurances from the exporter regarding origin of goods and blacklist
status of carriers or suppliers, similar to boycott certification requirements typically fulfilled by import and shipping document
certifictions or letter of credit conditions in less extensive export
transactions." Hard-line Arab states often required agreements that
" Statistics collected by the Commerce Department as a result of the reporting requirements of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. 369.1-.5 (1977), in effect prior to
January 18, 1978, show a substantial variation in boycott requests depending upon the Arab
country initiating the request. BUREAU OF EAST-WEST TRADE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ExPORT ADMNISTRATION REP. No. 114 10-19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
REP.].
11 Reliable information as to what boycott-related demands are made by Arab countries is
difficult to find. The statistical analysis of the EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REP., supra note 68,
is perhaps the best available published summary of boycott requests but is deficient in a
number of respects. First, it is dated. Second, the categories into which it divides requests
are overbroad. Third, the analysis does not show the changes in patterns of requests over time.
Accordingly, to a significant extent, in describing the effects of the boycott on business in
various Arab countries, the authors have had to rely on their own experience in the practice
of law and government service. But see also example of Iraqi tender offer reprinted in Foreign
Investment and Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearingson S.425, S.953, S.995, and S. 1303 Before
the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 209-11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Investment].
7 The New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry regularly publishes and makes
available to its members a listing of documents required for export to foreign countries. With
respect to Arab countries this listing includes boycott-related documentary requirements.
Regarding Saudi Arabian boycott requirements, see Documents Required for Shipments from
the United States to: Saudi Arabia, New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry, February
1976.
11Frequently, in large export sales transactions, exporters were asked not only to enter into
boycott-related agreements but also to issue certifications that paralleled these agreements.
See, example of agreement reprinted in ForeignInvestment, supra note 69, at 213-16.
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exporters forswear business with Israel or blacklisted persons and
that no services incident to the export transaction be provided by
blacklisted concerns. More moderate countries commonly required
such agreements and representations merely with regard to the particular exports in question. And, the most moderate states if they
required any boycott-related agreements at all, typically required
them only in relation to the origin of exports, the nationality of the
carrier and the route of the carrier in transporting the particular
export in question to the importing country.
The extent to which United States concerns tacitly complied with
boycott regulations in the selection of suppliers, carriers, insurers
and other United States persons prior to the effective date of the
EAA is hard to determine." In some cases, United States concerns
have completely disregarded boycott-related agreements with Arab
customers not to use blacklisted suppliers. In other instances, the
in terrorem effect of the boycott has probably caused United States
concerns to select suppliers on a boycott basis even in the absence
of a specific agreement to do so. It is likely that the substantial
increase in the scope and attractiveness of the Arab "market" and
a coincident increase in the vigor of boycott enforcement during the
period between 1973 and January 18, 1978, caused an increase in the
influence of the boycott on business choices of United States firms.
One indication of the increased vigor of the boycott apparatus
during this period was a constant increase in the boycott-related
screening of United States concerns by Arab countries. Hard-line
countries, especially, initiated investigations of United States concerns doing business in Arab countries. Such investigations inevitably involved a request that the corporation being investigated an73
swer a variant of the so-called general seven-point questionnaire.
72 There has been some speculation that compliance by United States businesses with Arab
boycott requirements prior to the effective dates of the EAA and EAR was extensive. Steiner,
supra note 12, at 1366. This opinion appears to be confirmed by Commerce Department
statistics which show overwhelming compliance by United States concerns with boycott
requests and requirements. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REP., supra note 68, at 19. See AMERICAN
BUSINESS, supra note 65, at ix, and SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS, FOREIGN BoYcoTrs, AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1976, S. REP. No. 917, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. 16 (1976).

However, for the most part, such "compliance" took the form of certifying and/or agreeing
that goods were not of Israeli origin and that goods would not be shipped on Israeli vessels or
via Israel.
" The following is the partial text of a so-called seven-point Arab boycott questionnaire
sent by the General Office for the Boycott of Israel, the Central Boycott Office, to an American company:
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In most cases, failure to answer the questionnaire meant eventual
blacklisting or, in the cases of persons already blacklisted, a denial
of requests to be removed from the blacklist.74
Prior to the effective date of the EAA and EAR, letters of credit
were the principal means of effecting payment in export transactions with Arab countries.7" They provided United States exporters
with a safe, inexpensive payments mechanism and United States
banks found them attractive because of their ease of administration.
Unfortunately, they also provided Arab countries with a simple
means of eliciting boycott-related information from exporters,
freight forwarders and shippers.
A letter of credit opened in an Arab country made to the order of
a United States beneficiary typically contained boycott-related conditions and requirements including a requirement that the beneficiary of the credit supply one or more of the following certifications:
(a) that neither the beneficiary nor its affiliates were on the Arab
blacklist, (b) that the goods covered by the credit were not made in
or did not include component parts made in Israel, (c) that the
goods covered by the credit were not made by or did not include
component parts made by blacklisted suppliers, and (d) that the
goods covered by the credit would not be insured by a blacklisted
A declaration containing your answers to the following questions:
Do you or any of your subsidiaries . . .:
1. Have now or ever had a branch or main factory or assembly plant in
Israel?
2. Have now or ever had general offices in Israel for regional or international operations?
3. Grant or ever granted the rights of using your names, trademarks,
manufacturing licenses, patents rights etc. . . to Israeli persons or firms?
4. Participate or own shares, now or in the past, in Israeli firms or
businesses inside or outside Israel?
5. Represent or ever represented any Israeli firm or business in Israel or
abroad?
6. Render or ever rendered any technological assistance to any Israeli
firm or business?
7. What are the names and nationalities of all companies in which you
hold shares and what is the percentage of your shareholding in each of
them? Moreover, what are the names and nationalities of the companies
holding shares in your company or its subsidiaries, and what is the percentage of the shareholding of each of them as to the total share capital
of the company participated?
Not infrequently, the seven-point questionnaire appeared in the form of an eight-point questionnaire in whiclvquestion 7 above was merely divided into two questions.
4 See Bahti, The Arab Economic Boycott of Israel, Brookings Inst. 7-32 (1967).
' Steiner, supra note 12, at 1372.
I.
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insurer, be shipped on an Israeli or blacklisted ship or be shiped via
Israel." Such letters of credit were commonly confirmed or advised
by United States financial institutions which, in accordance with
customary international banking practice, honored the credit only
so long as the beneficiary of the credit presented all the documents
required thereby including the boycott-related certificates.
Additionally, prior to January 18, 1978, some United States concerns probably diverted Arab world business either to independent
foreign distributors or foreign subsidiaries. Such diversion of business avoided the Commerce Department's then existing report requirements.7 7 The foreign entities could with regard to a non-United
States export transaction answer boycott questionnaires, enter into
boycott-based agreements and unilaterally make boycott certifications without filing a report with the Commerce Department.7 8 The
volume of this business diversion activity probably depended upon
(a) the availability of such foreign entities to a particular United
States concern, (b) the willingness of the United States concern to
be involved indirectly in boycott compliance behavior by foreign
distributors or affiliates, and (c) the extent to which the United
States concern feared public censure for engaging directly and publicly7" in boycott compliance activity itself. However, because the
previous Export Administration Regulations were only seriously
enforced in the two or three years immediately preceding the enactment off the EAA8 0 and because public interest in concerns reporting nondiscriminatory boycott compliance activity diminished after
an initial flurry of excitement following the institution by the Commerce Department of public disclosure of boycott reports in the Fall
of 1975,11 such diversionary activity prior to January 18, 1978, was
probably not widespread.

11ExPoRT ADMINISTRATION

REP., supra note 68, at 15.
77 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1977). See notes 53 to 54 supra.
" The reporting provisions required reports by United States exporters that had received
or were informed of a boycott request. 15 C.F.R. 369.4 (1977). The regulations defined United
States exporter as the person who controlled the export from the United States. 15 C.F.R.
370.2(28) (1977). Consequently, a persuasive argument can be made that if a transaction did
not involve an export from the United States, no exporter was required to file a boycott
request report with the Commerce Department.
" As noted earlier in this article, boycott reports filed with the Commerce Department were
made public beginning in the fall of 1976. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
Steiner, supra note 12, at 1370.
, See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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Specific Applications of the EAR to Export Transactions

This section is designed not only to demonstrate the impact of the
EAR on transactions with the Arab world and note gaps and imperfections in the EAR which may heighten this impact but also to
provide practical guidance for exporters doing business with the
Arab world. The analysis in this section assumes throughout, unless
the contrary is stated, that the threshold tests for application of the
EAA-United States commerce, 2 United States person,' 3 and intent 4-are met.
a.

FurnishingInformation"

The EAA prohibits furnishing information regarding business relations with a boycotted country or with persons known or believed
to be blacklisted." However, certain of its exceptions allow furnish7
ing of information provided the criteria of the exceptions are met.
The most significant exception allows furnishing information in response to import and shipping document requirements of a boycotting country.
The conclusions expressed in this subsection apply, unless otherwise specified, whether the information is provided, directly or
through others," to customs officials," to customers0 pursuant to
N2

See notes 37-55 supra and accompanying text.

" See notes 28-36 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 56-63 supra and accompanying text.
" The TRA in contrast to the EAA contains no general prohibition on furnishing information. Thus, the TRA Guidelines provide that a mere certification that a carrier, insurer or
supplier is not blacklisted does not constitute participation or cooperation. Treasury Department Boycott Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRA Guidelines].
However, an agreement to certify that no supplier, carrier or insurer is blacklisted does
constitute participation or cooperation. TRA Guidelines H-32 and H-34, 43 Fed. Reg. 3465
(1978). And, when a particular supplier has been specified by the importer, an agreement to
supply a certificate that states the supplier is not blacklisted constitutes participation or
cooperation so long as the supplier is (i) a United States person (within the meaning of TRA
Guidelines), (ii) a boycotted country or national of a boycotted country, or (iii) a person that
the exporter knows or has reason to know is unable to certify as required because the supplier's ownership or management is made up in whole or in part of individuals of a particular
religion, race or nationality. TRA Guideline H-13, 43 Fed. Reg. 3463 (1978).
8 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1)(D).
' EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(B).
The EAR clearly and simply prohibit the "furnishing" of certain information by a United
States person. EAR § 369.2(d)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3521 (1978). Nowhere do the EAR suggest that
the manner in which the information is furnished limits the prohibition. On the contrary,
examples, particularly in the anti-evasion section of the EAR, make clear that prohibited
information may not be furnished with intent to support a boycott even if the information is
supplied in normal commercial documents, EAR § 369.4, Example (i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534
(1978), or through the means of a third party, EAR § 369.4, Example (v), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534
(1978).
g EAR § 369.2(d)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3521 (1978).
EAR § 369.2(d), Example (x), 43 Fed. Reg. 3522 (1978).
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purchase order conditions, to banks pursuant to letter of credit conditions9 or to others. 2 They apply to information furnished at the
exporter's initiative" as well as to information specifically requested
in tender documents, 94 questionnaires," power of attorney forms,9"
by letters of credit clauses97 or otherwise." The conclusions pertain
to the information supplied in a particular instance whether or not
this is the same information which has been requested, for example,
the rules governing positive certifications apply to positive certificates given in response to requests for negative certificates. 9 However, the EAA's shipping document exception applies only if the
information provided is furnished in compliance with the boycotting
country's shipping documentation requirements.'0 It should also be
noted that information regarding a person's relationships with
blacklisted persons, boycotted countries, and nationals of boycotted
countries, though supplied in a normal commercial format such as
an annual report, may not be supplied in response to a boycott
request.' 0'
(1)

Conclusions

After June 21, 1978,102 a United States person exporting goods to
EAR

§ 369.2(f),

Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit, Example (i), 43

Fed. Reg. 3524 (1978).
92 EAR § 369.2(d), 43 Fed. Reg. 3521 (1978).
9
EAR § 369.2(d)(2)(ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3521 (1978).
EAR § 369.2(d), Example (i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3521 (1978).
EAR § 369.2(d), Example (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3521 (1978).
" EAR § 369.2(d), Example (xvii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3522 (1978).
,7EAR § 369.2(f), Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit, Example (i), 43
Fed. Reg. 3524 (1978).
1' See note 92 supra.
9,EAR § 369.3(b), Example (i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
EAR § 369.3(b)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
101EAR § 369.2(d)(4), 43 Fed. Reg. 3521 (1978). See notes 188-191 infra and accompanying
text for one anomaly that results from the EAR's treatment of the furnishing of otherwise
permitted information in response to a boycott request.
'02 The "grace period" permitting the furnishing of information in negative, blacklisting
and exclusionary terms provided in EAA sec. 201, §§ 4A(a)(5)(B) and 4A(a)(2)(B); in EAR
§ 369.3(b)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978); and EAR § 369.5, 43 Fed. Reg. 3536 (1978) lasted
until June 22, 1978. From the effective date of the EAA through June 21, 1978, a United States
exporter could provide the following information: (1) that the good or service exported is not
of Israeli origin or that it is of United States or other specific country origin, EAR § 369.3(b),
Examples (i) and (ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978); (2) that the export carrier is not blacklisted,
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the Arab world is only able to provide the following information in
response to or in anticipation of a boycott-related requirement or
request: (i) the specific country of origin of the export,0 3 (ii) the
specific name of the carrier,"' (iii) that the carrier is not owned by
Israel, does not fly the Israeli flag and will not arrive at the importing country after having passed through Israel," 5 (iv) the name of
the insurer or supplier,0 6 and (v) the blacklist status of the exporter
itself. 07
EAR § 369.3(b), Example (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978), is not owned by Israelis, does not
fly the Israeli flag, EAR § 369.3(b)(2), § 369.3(b), Example (vii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978),
will not stop at an Israeli port immediately prior to arriving at the importing country, EAR
§369.3(b), Examples (ix) and (xi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978); (3) the name of the carrier, EAR
§ 369.3(b), Example (viii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978); (4) that the insurer or supplier is not
blacklisted, EAR § 369.3(b), Example (v), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978); (5) the name of the
specific insurer or supplier, EAR § 369.3(b), Example (x), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978); and (6)
the blacklist status of the exporter itself, EAR § 369.3(b), Example (x), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526
(1978).
Particular care should have been taken not to enter into export or other transactions
payment for which would be made after June 21, 1978, under a letter of credit which included
a requirement or condition that negative certifications (other than certifying the nonuse of
Israeli vessels or prescribed routes) be furnished. The United States supplier not able to fulfill
such negative certification requirements or conditions after June 21, 1978, has no recourse
against the issuing or confirming bank if the requirements or conditions were not met before
that date, unless the letter of credit can be amended to delete or modify the objectionable
certification. EAR § 369.2(f) passim. The bank may have no legal obligation to secure such
an amendment, however. Id.
103EAR § 369.3(b), Example (i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
1-4 EAR § 369.3(b), Example (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
105 EAR §§ 369.3(b)(2), 369.3(b), Examples (vi), (vii) and (xi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
101EAR § 369.3(b), Examples (iv) and (v), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
017The EAR nowhere explicitly permit a United States person to supply information about
its blacklist status. That furnishing such information is not prohibited can be inferred from
EAR § 369.2(f), Example (xiv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3524 (1978). Example (xiv) states that a United
States bank may implement a letter of credit requiring a beneficiary to certify that he is not
on the blacklist. The bank may not, however, insist that the certification be furnished because
by so insisting "it would be refusing to do business with a blacklisted person in compliance
with a boycott." Id. Since banks are prohibited from implementing a letter of credit containing a requirement, compliance with which is prohibited, the implication of this example is
that simple certification of nonblacklist status is not a prohibited act.
The permission to furnish such information can also be inferred from the absence of example (ix) of section 369.2(d) of the proposed regulations. 42 Fed. Reg. 48565 (1977). Example
(ix) of the proposed regulations stated that a United States company could not give a boycotting country a certification that the company was not on the blacklist. This example reasoned
that furnishing such information necessarily conveyed information about the company's past
dealings with boycotted countries or blacklisted persons. This example has been omitted from
the final regulations. Instead, a new example is included in EAR which points out that a
United States company cannot certify that its supplier is not on the blacklist.
The correctness of these inferences has been confirmed in an "interpretation" issued by the
Commerce Department's Industry and Trade Administration. EAR § 369, Appendix, 43 Fed.
Reg. 16969 (1978). Responding to certain requests for certifications (which it is believed have
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Gaps and Imperfections

(i) Furnishing Blacklist Status Information. The EAR permit
the furnishing of information regarding a United States person's
own blacklist status, but not information as to the blacklist status
of one's affiliates. 0 8 Such a prohibition against furnishing information as to the blacklist status of one's affiliates creates significant
practical difficulties for exporters. First, information as to the
blacklist status of a company's affiliates has traditionally been requested by a number of Arab countries. 019 Second, the prohibition
diminishes the value to exporters of being permitted to certify as to
their own blacklist status since it is not uncommon for an exporter
doing business with Arab countries to be asked in a single question
to certify as to its own blacklist status as well as to that of its parent
corporation and its affiliates. Failure to respond by the exporter to
the entire question can mean loss of the export sale.
The EAR do not provide a clear rationale for distinguishing bebeen proposed by Saudi Arabia) the Department finds that each of the declarations (a) that
a vessel is "otherwise eligible to enter into the ports of the boycotting country in conformity
with its laws and regulations," id., and (b)"that a freight insurer "has a duly qualified and
appointed agent or representative in the boycotting country," id. at 16970, is equivalent to a
certification that the vessel or the freight forwarder, respectively, is not blacklisted. The
Department further determines that a vessel's owner, charter or master and the insurance
company, respectively, may furnish such certifications even after June 21, 1978, the end of
the mini grace period for negative certifications. However, the Department also points out
that "[Wihere a person other than the vessel's owner, charter or master furnishes such a
statement, that is tantamount to furnishing a statement that he is not doing business with a
blacklisted person or is doing business only with blacklisted persons [and is prohibited from
furnishing such a statement unless it is clear] that the certification is not required for a
boycott reason." Id. at 16969, 16970.
It should be noted that although the EAR permit a United States person to advise a
boycotted country that it is not blacklisted, such a self-certification may give rise to a number
of problems for the certifier including: (a) adverse tax consequences, if the self-certification
is provided to satisfy a condition in a letter of credit, TRA Guideline H-29A, note 85, 43 Fed.
Reg. 3464 (1978), (b) reporting obligations under the yet-to-be finalized EAR reporting requirements, § 319.6, Example (14), 42 Fed. Reg. 65,595 (1977), and (c) violations of the EAR
through evasion or aiding and abetting in an EAR violation of the certifier knows or has reason
to know that the party requesting the self-certification is contravening the EAR. EAR § 369.4,
Example (xviii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3524 (1978); 15 C.F.R. § 387.2, 387.3, 387.7 (1977).
I" The version of the EAR published in the Federal Register on January 25, 1978, was far
from clear on this point. One example clearly stated that a United States person, "may
furnish the information about the nationality of its owners, because it is not information
about . . . [the company's] business relationships." EAR § 369.2(d), Example (xvi), 43 Fed.
Reg. 3522 (1978). However, in amendments and clarifications to the EAR published in the
Federal Register on March 20, 1978, it was made clear that a United States person cannot
certify as to the blacklist status of its affiliate. 43 Fed. Reg. 11576 (1978).
'" See note 73 supra.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 8:581

tween furnishing blacklist status information about oneself on the
one hand and the furnishing of such information about one's affiliates on the other. Nor can such a rationale easily be discerned from
either the EAA or its legislative history." 0
One explanation why the Commerce Department has distinguished between furnishing blacklist status information about oneself and one's affiliates is that the Department feels that if it permits a person to furnish blacklist status information about an affiliate there is absolutely no logical way to prohibit furnishing such
information about any third party. However, while it indeed may
be true that there is no purely logical way, reasoning from the EAR
and EAA to this distinction, a purposive argument of why the Department should permit the furnishing of some but not all blacklist
status information recommends itself.
It can be argued that one of the reasons Congress agreed upon the
need for a furnishing information prohibition is to discourage
United States persons from inquiring as to other persons' relationships with the boycotted country so as not to cause a chilling effect
on business relationships between persons not directly involved in
the boycott, that is, foster the so-called tertiary boycott.", Accordingly, if a concern in seeking information for an Arab customer
about the blacklist status of a supplier learns that the supplier is
on the blacklist, the concern may be less willing to do business with
the supplier in the future regardless of the reason for the blacklisting. On the other hand, supplying information about one's own
blacklist status to an Arab customer will obviously not give rise to
new information nor have a chilling effect on business relationships
within the United States. Similarly, providing information about
one's own affiliates to an Arab customer is not apt to result in
providing new information which would have a chilling effect on
one's business relationship.
Thus, there is at least one reasonable place along the slippery
slope for the Commerce Department to stop. In the absence of a
cogent argument on the part of the Department in support of any
other reasonable stopping point and in the interest of fostering
While the legislative history gives no rationale for the distinction, it does provide clear
support for the proposition that a concern should not supply information about its dealings
with blacklisted persons. SENATE REPORr, supra note 7, at 39. However, the legislative history
does not state whether or not this proposition applies to all persons, including the concern
furnishing the information itself, or merely nonaffiliated third parties.
...SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 22.
tO
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where possible"' 2 business relationships with the Arab world, the
Commerce Department should amend the EAR to permit companies to give blacklist status information about their affiliates.
(ii) Furnishing Third-Party Self-Certifications. A second question related to the right of self-certification is whether it permits a
person to furnish a boycott office, Arab customer, bank or import
authorities with a self-certification regarding blacklist status provided by a third party. The EAA could be read to the effect that by
passing on the certificate of a third party, a company would be
furnishing prohibited information about one's relationship with that
other person. However, the EAR clearly permit a bank to do just
that"' in implementing a letter of credit conditioned upon the beneficiary certifying to his own blacklist status. If a bank is permitted
to pass on the blacklist status certificate of a beneficiary, there
appears to be no logical reason why an exporter may not also pass
on such a certificate, from say an insurer or shipper. Whether this
interpretation will be accepted by the Commerce Department remains to be seen. However, if the Department does not accept such
an interpretation, it will probably have to disavow the aforementioned letter of credit example.
There are several practical limitations on the use of the right of
self-certification which are apt to detract from its utility as a device
to permit certain export transactions with the Arab world to continue. First, self-certifications by third parties to the transactions
may be unacceptable to the Arab customer, to import authorities
or to banks issuing or confirming letters of credit. The customary
practice has been to require the exporter himself to make the certification for third parties. Where a letter of credit calls for the exporter
to certify as to the blacklist status of an insurer, the issuing or
confirming bank will be exposed"' and may be unable to collect if
it accepts the certificate of the insurer itself as to its own blacklist
status. Customers and import authorities may be unwilling to take
third party certificates. It is possible, however, that greater flexibility will come with time if the practice of self-certification gains
general recognition.
Second, requests for self-certifications are likely to be publicly
"' Fostering business relations when possible without violation of the EAA has been favored by Congress. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
113EAR § 369.2(f), Example (xiv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3524 (1978).
"' See notes 224-230 infra and accompanying text.
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reportable"5 and the reporting person (exporter and/or supplier) receiving such a request must state in his report whether or not he has
complied or will comply with the request. A great many companies
have concluded as a matter of corporate policy that they will not
comply with any reportable boycott request. Unless these policies
change, perhaps either to conform to the limitations of the antiboycott law or otherwise, self-certifications will not be a solution for
these companies." 6
Third, in present form the EAR make it clear that one cannot
compel another to furnish a self-certification, even if a contract
provision so specifies. The EAR reason that to do so would be tantamount to a refusal to do business contravening yet another statutory prohibition." 7 Thus, any arrangement with a customer which
is dependent upon others to furnish self-certifications involves a
significant degree of risk. As noted below in subsection IV A.2.e.8 (2)
of this Article such an arrangement is untenable for banks."1 It
could also cause immense financial problems for exporters. For instance, if an exporter is asked by an Arab customer to supply the
self-certification of a component supplier in a large export transaction and after initially agreeing to so certify the component supplier
decides not to do so, the EAR prohibit the exporter from requiring
the certificate and the Arab customer may refuse to accept the
exporter's shipment without it.
The Commerce Department should clarify the scope of permitted
self-certification. In the EAR's present form an Arab customer can
force difficult decisions on the exporter. If the customer decides to
require third party self-certification, the exporter cannot be sure
whether this is permitted or not. Some exporters, if the stakes are
"I The Commerce Department's proposed reporting regulations define a reportable request
as one which the recipient knows or has reason to know has as its purpose "to enforce,
implement or otherwise further or support a foreign boycott or restrictive trade practice," §
369.6(a)(2)(ii), 42 Fed. Reg. 65,543 (1977), and which is not excepted under § 369.6(a)(5), 42
Fed. Reg. 65,543 (1977). Further, the proposed regulations emphasize that requests will be
reportable regardless of whether the action requested is prohibited or permissible under the
Act and implementing regulations. § 369.6(a)(1), 42 Fed. Reg. 65,593 (1977). As blacklist selfcertifications are not explicitly excepted by Prop. Regs. § 369.6(a)(5), it would almost certainly be reportable under the proposed reporting regulations.
-' Self-certifications may also give rise to income tax problems. If the self-certification is
required by the terms of an agreement or as a condition or requirement of a letter of credit,
the Department of Treasury takes the position that an agreement constituting boycott participation for income tax purposes has been made. TRA Guideline, supra note 85, at H-29A, 43
Fed. Reg. 3465 (1978).
"' EAR § 369.2(f), Example (xiv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3524 (1978).
' See notes 224-230 infra and accompanying text.
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high enough, are apt to decide that it is permitted. This interpretation then presents a dilemma to the rest of the United States export
community. To refuse to accept the interpretation may mean loss
of export sales; to accept it may mean violation of the EAA and
criminal and civil penalties.
On the other hand, if the EAR are merely clarified to permit selfcertification but to prohibit United States persons from requiring
such certification of others, exporters will be faced with perhaps an
even greater problem. To enter into an export transaction that involves third party self-certification will give rise to the financial
problems specified above; not to do so may mean loss to other exporters of export sales.
Finally, regardless of whether third party self-certification is permitted, so long as any self-certification is permitted by the EAR,
Arab customers may still obtain both the information and the goods
they desire by simply ordering and demanding the certification directly from the supplier. Accordingly, it would appear advisable for
the Commerce Department either to eliminate self-certification altogether or to clarify its treatment of third party self-certifications.
b.
(1)

Boycott-related Agreements
Conclusions

The EAA prohibits not only engaging in specified boycott activities but also knowingly agreeing to engage in such activities.", A
United States person need not take or intend to take actions as the
result of such an agreement for the boycott-related agreement by
1
the United States person to constitute a violation of the EAA. 20
Further, neither the EAA nor the EAR differentiates on the basis
of what form the agreement takes nor in what document if any the
agreement appears. 121 Accordingly, the following conclusions apply
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1).
EAR § 369.2(a), Agreements to Refuse to Do Business, Example (ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3519
(1978).
" Both the EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1) and the EAR § 369.2(a)-(f), 43 Fed. Reg. 3517-25
(1978), prohibit a United States person from taking an action and knowingly agreeing to take
such action. Nowhere in the EAA, the EAR or the legislative history, is there a qualification
as to the type of agreement or form of the agreement. On the contrary, in the few instances
when the form of prohibited agreements are discussed it is to broaden the concept of an
agreement. EAR § 369.2(a)(9), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978); EAR § 369.2(a), Agreements to
Refuse to Do Business, Example (ix), 43 Fed. Reg. 3520 (1978). Accordingly, it would seem
in determining whether or not an agreement is covered by the prohibition one should determine whether or not it actually constitutes an agreement in accordance with applicable
contract law principles.
"'

612
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to provisions in invitations to bid,,, purchase orders, letters of credit
and other contracts, associated agreements and commitments
whether written or oral,'23 express or implied by a course of conduct. " 4
It should be emphasized that while the EAR prohibit an exporter
from entering into certain boycott-related agreements after the
effective date of the EAA and EAR, the EAR do not prohibit an
exporter or any other United States person from being a party to a
contract that contains a prohibited boycott agreement entered into
prior to the effective date of the EAR so long as the United States
person does not further effectuate the prohibited agreement itself.'2
An exporter may at any time renegotiate a prohibited boycott agreement to make it accord with the rules of the EAR.'
Exporters and other United States persons are prohibited by the
EAR from entering into agreements which: (i) require furnishing of
information which is forbidden (one may agree not to ship goods of
Israeli origin, but may not agree to give a negative certificate of
origin at time of import);'27 (ii) preclude the use of blacklisted carriers, insurers and suppliers; 2 8 (iii) impose "risk of loss" on the
supplier whereby the supplier agrees to indemnify the exporter if the
supplier's goods are denied entry to the country of destination (the
EAR contain an exception, however, when such clauses were used
by the exporter prior to January 18, 1978, or are required for legitimate non-boycott reasons and are customary in the exporter's dealing with non-boycotting countries);' 29 or (iv) state that the exporter
"2 EAR § 369.2(a), Agreement to Refuse to Do Business, Example (ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3519
(1978).
I" See note 121 supra.
121 EAR § 369.2(a)(9), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978). Similarly, the TRA Guidelines provide that
an agreement can be implied by a course of conduct. TRA Guidelines, supra note 85, at H-9,
43 Fed. Reg. 3463 (1978).
I" EAR § 369.5(f), 43 Fed. Reg. 3536 (1978). It should be noted that the TRA treats prior
agreements quite differently. A boycott agreement included in a contract entered into prior
to the effective date of the TRA constitutes participation in the boycott, if the contract
remains in effect even if there is no compliance with the boycott agreement. TRA Guideline
E-6, 43 Fed. Reg. 3460-61 (1978). To avoid participation in the boycott, the United States
person must renounce the agreement and communicate its renunciation to the other party
to the contract. Id.
"6 EAR § 369.2(a), Agreements to Refuse to Do Business, Example (i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3519
(1978).
"7 EAR § 369.2(d) passim, 43 Fed. Reg. 3521 (1978).
l2 EAR § 369.2(a) passim, 43 Fed. Reg. 3517-18 (1978). See also EAR § 369.2(a), Agreements to Refuse to Do Business, Example (ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3519 (1978).
I" EAR 99 369.2(a)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 3517 (1978); 369.4(d), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1978);
369.4(d), Examples (x)-(xii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
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30
will comply with the boycott law of the boycotting country.'

Exporters and other United States persons are permitted by the
EAR to enter into agreements, even though boycott-related, which:
(i) preclude the importation of Israeli-origin goods or goods containing Israeli-origin materials or components, 3 ' or require that the
goods be of a particular country of origin;'3 2 (ii) prohibit the ship-

ment of goods to a boycotting country aboard an Israeli carrier; 33
(iii) prohibit transiting of Israel or require particular routes so long
as they are in conjunction with the transportation of an export to a
boycotting country;' 34 (iv) require the use of particular carriers, insurers or suppliers if (A) there is no reason to believe that the selection was boycott based, or (B) the selection is made by the boycotting country or a resident thereof and meets all the requirements of
the unilateral selection and local law compliance exceptions, 135 (v)
require the supplier to effect delivery and pass title in the boycotting
country as a condition of payment; 131 (vi) provide that the law of the
boycotting country will apply to or govern interpretation of an export contract; 137 or (vii) state that the exporter will comply with the
8
laws of the boycotting country.

3

(2) Gaps and Imperfections
(i) Bid and Tender. A significant amount of export sales to Arab
countries have in the past resulted from successful competitive bidding by United States exporters. Tenders by Arab nationals or governments have not infrequently contained boycott requirements
which United States bidders have either agreed to or ignored. At
' EAR § 369.2(a)(5), Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978); EAR § 369.2(a), Agreements to Refuse to Do
Business, Example (v), 43 Fed. Reg. 3519 (1978).
131 EAR 99 369.3(a-1)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3525 (1978); 369.3(a-1), Examples (i) and (ii), 43
Fed. Reg. 3525 (1978).
132 When the EAR do not prohibit the taking of an action nor explicitly prohibit an agreement to take such an action, it follows that such an agreement is not, in fact, prohibited.
I" EAR § 369.3(a-2), Example (ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3525 (1978).
134 EAR § 369.3(a-2), Example (i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3525 (1978).
'" See EAR § 369.3(c), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526-28 (1978); EAR § 369.3(f), 43 Fed. Reg. 3531-34
(1978); notes 261-307 infra and accompanying text.
136 EAR § 369.4, Examples (xiii) and (xiv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
, EAR § 369.2(a), Agreement to Refuse to Do Business, Example (iii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3519
(1978).
'" EAR §§ 369.2(a)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978); 369.2(a), Agreement to Refuse to Do
Business, Example (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3519 (1978). However, it should be noted that the
Treasury Department has interpreted such generalized law compliance clauses to be boycott
participation for federal income tax purposes. TRA Guideline, supra note 85, at H-4, 43 Fed.
Reg. 3463 (1978).
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times, United States exporters have been successful in eliminating
such requirements from the final export contract.
The EAR endanger this export business by making it impossible
for a United States exporter to respond to a tender which contains
a prohibited boycott requirement unless the exporter explicitly excepts the requirement from its bid.'39 United States exporters are in
effect no longer permitted to respond in their bids to boycott requirements with silence and to amend or eliminate the requirement
when and if they are awarded the export contract.4 0 This appears
to be the case even when the tender does not call for an agreement
on prohibited boycott certifications by the exporter at the time the
bid is made but rather when the final contract is signed.'
This EAR interpretation is not compelled by either the EAA or
applicable legislative history. It runs counter to a general theme of
the EAR favoring reformation of documents containing prohibited
boycott terms.' Further, if a United States exporter responds to a
tender that contains a prohibited boycott condition, with no intention whatever of complying or agreeing to comply with that condition, it is difficult to see how the exporter's action includes the
element of intent requisite to a violation of EAA's antiboycott prohibitions. Thus, the EAR should be amended to permit a United
States exporter to bid on a contract that contains boycott requirements provided that in doing so the exporter does not furnish prohibited information and provided that if awarded the contract, the
exporter eliminates the prohibited requirement either before executing the contract or before beginning work under the contract.
(ii) Risk of Loss. In at least one respect' the EAR attempt to
insure that one United States concern is not favored over another
merely as a result of its past business structure, practices or policies
,"I EAR § 369.2(a), Agreement to Refuse to Do Business, Example (ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3519
(1978).
140 Id.
I11

Id.

14 EAR § 369.2(f), Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit, Example (iv), 43
Fed. Reg. 3524 (1978).
" The EAR permit a United States concern not previously a resident in a boycotting
country to establish residency, and thus be in a position to take advantage of the EAR's local
law compliance exception, by furnishing boycott-related information which, if furnished in
other context by a non-boycotting country resident, would be prohibited. EAR § 369.2(d),
Example (xii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3522 (1978); EAR § 369.4, Example (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
This exception is not clearly provided for in either the EAA or its legislative history and thus
appears to be a recognition of the concept that the antiboycott law should not favor one
United States person over another merely because of past history.
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in relation to the Arab world prior to the effective date of the EAA
and EAR. While bias based on historical happenstance may be to
some extent inevitable with the institution of any new set of regulations, it is a result more to be tolerated than encouraged.
Unfortunately, without justification the EAR do in at least two
instances significantly favor certain business concerns over others
based on prior history. Both of these cases will be discussed in this
article. The first dealing with the use of the "risk-of-loss" clause will
be discussed immediately below. The second dealing with removal
from the blacklist will be discussed in subsection IV A.2d.(2).
A risk-of-loss provision is not uncommon in international export
transactions. It appropriately shifts the contractual allocation of
responsibilities and risks to the party most able to assess them. The
provision was completely sanctioned by the proposed EAR' and
continues to be so sanctioned by the Treasury Department's antiboycott guidelines.'
The EAR do not prohibit the use of the clause. The EAR specifically provide that the use of the clause is not in and of itself a
prohibited refusal to do business,' and that use of the clause after
the EAR's effective date by firms that used it before that date will
be presumed not to constitute evasion.'4 7 In contrast, however, the
EAR provide that introduction of a risk-of-loss clause by a business
concern for the first time after the effective date of the EAR, will
be presumed to constitute evasion.' 8 Such a presumption can only
be rebutted by an affirmative showing: (i) that the clause is a
"customary usage" without distinction between boycotted and boycotting country and (ii) that there is a legitimate nonboycott reason
for its use.'
The EAR give no explanation why business concerns using the
clause prior to the effective date of the EAR should be benefitted
more than concerns adopting the clause after the effective date.
Neither the EAA nor its legislative history provide any clear support
I" Prop. EAR §§ 369.2(a)(7) & 369.2(a), Agreements to Refuse to Do Business, Example
(viii), 42 Fed. Reg. 48,564 (1977).
"I TRA Guidelines supra note 85, at Part J, 43 Fed. Reg. 3466-67 (1978). However, in
accordance with the introductory definition (g) in the TRA Guidelines, an overall course of
conduct that includes the use of risk of loss clauses in addition to other factors could support
the inference of a boycott agreement.
"I EAR § 369.2(a)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978).
.,7 EAR § 369.4(d), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534-35 (1978).
14AId.
14"
Id.
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for such a distinction. Nor do the EAR treat other, similar riskshifting devices on this basis. The EAR permit an exporter to require its suppliers to deliver goods on an in-country basis, 5 ' or to
require that title remain with its suppliers until a delivery is effected
in a boycotting country, 5 ' regardless of whether or not the exporter
customarily imposed such requirements before the effective date of
the EAA and EAR.
In the absence of any justification for treating United States business concerns differently on the basis of whether or not they utilized
risk-of-loss clauses in their dealings with the Arab world before or
after the effective date of the EAA and EAR, the Department
should amend the EAR at the very least to provide uniform treatment for all United States concerns. In light of the position taken
by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA) vis-a-vis risk-of-loss clauses
as well as the EAR's treatment of other previously mentioned riskshifting devices which provide exporters with similar means of doing
business in boycotting countries,'5 2 it seems logical that such an
amendment should take the form of a general loosening of the restriction on the use of risk-of-loss clauses.
c.

Boycott-based Selections

(1)

Conclusions

The EAR severely limit but do not eliminate boycott-based selections of suppliers of goods or services. The regulations recognize the
rights of a boycotting country as well as nationals and residents of
that country to select imports for use within the country. This recognition is primarily reflected in the EAR's unilateral selection exception ' which permits exporters to implement the boycott-based
selections by boycotting countries and nationals and residents of
those countries, including United States persons who are "bona fide
11EAR

§ 369.4, Example (xiii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
"I EAR § 369.4, Example (xiv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
152 The EAR attempt to distinguish the use of risk-of-loss clauses and other risk-shifting
devices on the basis that a risk-of-loss clause is "an extraordinary arrangement designed to
require that the risk of loss remain with the supplier even after title [has] passed." EAR §
369.4, Example (xiv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978). However, it is not at all clear that the use of
a risk-of-loss clause in export transactions with the Arab world is any more extraordinary than
forcing the supplier to retain title to goods until they are delivered in a boycotting country.
"I EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(C); EAR § 369.3(c), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526-28 (1978).
The conduct of United States person in initiating such selections is governed, however, by
another significant exception that deals with compliance with local law. See notes 261-298
infra and accompanying text.
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residents" of boycotting countries." 4 Second, the EAR permit exporters on their own initiative to make a certain limited number of
boycott-based selections.' 55 The conclusions regarding boycottbased selections expressed below are divided to reflect these two
categories of selections permitted by the EAR.
(i) The UnilateralSelection Exception. The unilateral selection
exception permits exporters to implement boycott-based selections
of suppliers of goods or services including carriers and insurers if
certain conditions are met.'56 The exception itself does not relate to
the conduct of an exporter-supplier in complying with a boycottbased selection of his own goods or services. However, nothing in the
EAA or EAR forbid a United States person from responding to a
boycott-based selection of his own products or services, and this fact
is noted in the EAR's discussion of the unilateral selection excep57
tion.
The conditions which must be met in order for an exporter to
implement a boycott-based selection of goods or services to be supplied by a third party include:
(a) The selection must originate with a boycotting country
or a national or resident thereo'5 8 or with a United States
person that is a bona fide resident of the boycotting coun"' including a resident branch or office of the exporter. 6 "
try 59
The EAR note, however, that intracompany transactions
will be given very close scrutiny by the Commerce Department to determine whether the selection really originated in
the boycotting country, as required for the exception to
"5 There is no unilateral selection exception in the TRA boycott provisions. However, the
TRA Guidelines state that for tax purposes an agreement to refrain from doing business with
others, e.g., with Israel or blacklisted persons, will not be inferred "solely" from obedience to
a specific selection. TRA Guidelines supra, note 85, at H-14, H-15, 43 Fed. Reg. 3463-64
(1978).
1 See notes 176-179 infra and accompanying text.
l EAR § 369.3(c)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
'5
"'

EAR § 369.3(c)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
EAR § 369.3(c)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
Id.

The EAR permit an exporter to implement the unilateral selection of any bona fide
resident of a boycotting country regardless of whether the resident is a juridical person and
regardless of what class of juridical person the resident might be. EAR §§ 369.3(c)(1), 43 Fed.
Reg. 3526 (1978); 369.3(c) passim, 43 Fed. Reg. 3526-28 (1978); 369.3(c), Specific and Unilateral Selection, Example (ii), Boycotting Country Buyer, Examples (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v), 43
Fed. Reg. 3528-29 (1978).
ISO
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apply. 6 ' A selection made outside a boycotting country by an
agent of the boycotting country or government or a resident
of the boycotting country will not qualify for the exception.'
An exporter receiving a selection which it has reason to know
is boycott-based, transmitted by a United States person outside the boycotting country, has a duty to inquire whether
the selection originated in the boycotting country. 3 An exporter may accept assurances from an agent of the boycotting country regarding boycotting country origin of the selection without further investigation.6 4
(b) The selection must be unilateral and specific, specifying one particular carrier, insurer or other supplier of services, in affirmative terms.6 5 It must be made by a party in
the boycotting country at its own discretion. 66 It is permissible for the exporter or someone else to provide a list of
choices and to make a recommendation to the selecting party
in the boycotting country, provided such pre-award activity
is consistent with customary practices of the exporter or the
exporter's industry and provided there is no screening out or
identification of blacklisted persons by the exporter.'6 7 Even
though a customer may utilize such nonboycott-related preaward services in making a boycott-based selection, the exporter or any other person providing the pre-award services
may still comply with the selection and provide post-award
services to the customer. 6 "
(c) Any specifically selected goods must in the normal
course of business be identifiable by source when imported
into the boycotting country.' This condition will be met by
goods identifiable in the normal course of business by trademark, trade name, symbol or other identification on the
EAR § 369.3(c), Boycotting Country Buyer, Examples (ii) and (iii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3529
(1978).
"I EAR § 369.3(c), Boycotting Country Buyer, Examples (iv) and (v), 43 Fed. Reg. 3529
(1978).
'3 EAR
84 EAR
(1978).
lBS EAR
66 EAR

§ 369.3(c)(11), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
§ 369.3(c), Specific and Unilateral Selection, Example (viii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3528

§§ 369.3(c)(3) and (4), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
§ 369.3(c)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).

EAR § 369.3(c)(6), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
EAR § 369.3(c), Specific and Unilateral Selection, Example (xi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3528
(1978).
" EAR § 369.3(c)(16), 43 Fed. Reg. 3528 (1978).
',
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product or its packaging.'70 Also, it may be met by goods
identifiable through uniqueness of design or appearance."'
Goods identifiable as to source solely by means of import
documentation will not qualify for the exception.'7 2
(d) Specifically selected services must necessarily be performed in significant part within the boycotting country
from which the selection was made.' Such services are only
considered performed within the boycotting country if they
are of a type that would customarily be performed' by the
supplier of services in any foreign country from which such
a selection would come. 17 5
(ii) Boycott-based Selections by Exporters. The EAR permit
exporters themselves to make the following boycott-based selections
with respect to shipments to a boycotting country so long as such
selections are made in accordance with the import and shipping
requirements of the importing country: (i) the exporter may select
out goods and materials of Israeli origin;'76 (ii) the exporter may
select from among carriers that call at ports of the importing country;' 77 and (iii) the exporter may also direct the carrier to follow a
prescribed route or not transit Israel. 78 However, the EAR do not
79
permit exporters to select out blacklisted suppliers and insurers.
(2)

Gaps and Imperfections

There are some serious discontinuities between the EAR's unilateral selection exception 80 and local law compliance section'"' with
regard to the selection of services. These discontinuities are dis12
cussed below in section IV.B.
I70EAR § 369.3(c)(17), 43 Fed. Reg. 3528 (1978).
171

Id.

172Id.

,71EAR § 369.3(c)(13), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
', EAR § 369.3(c)(14), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527-28 (1978).
'71 EAR § 369.3(c)(15), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
"I EAR § 369.3(a-1)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3525 (1978).
,17EAR § 369.3(a-2)(1)(i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3525 (1978).
171 EAR § 369.(a-2)(1)(ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3525 (1978).
'"' EAR § 369.2(a), Refusals to Do Business, Examples (i), (ii), (iii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518
(1978); EAR § 369.2(a)(6), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978).
IN EAR § 369.3(c), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526-28 (1978).
I' EAR § 369.3(f), 43 Fed. Reg. 3531 (1978).
12 See notes 261-309 infra and accompanying text.
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d. Responding to General Boycott-based Questionnaires
(1) Conclusions
The EAR deals unequivocally and severely with responses to general questionnaires from the central or regional boycott offices or
other boycotting country residents or officials. General questionnaires or other inquiries seeking information about the blacklist or
non-blacklist status of the exporter's affiliates or the exporter's activities in or business relationships with Israel or Israeli parties or
blacklisted persons may not be answered, either negatively or by the
providing of affirmative information which enables the questioner
to reach a conclusion with respect to the question put.'83
Probably the only safe response to a boycott questionnaire for a
United States person who is not a bona fide resident of the boycotting country is that United States law prohibits United States persons from answering such questionnaires. However, as will be discussed in more detail below,' 84 where the exporter is seeking to establish or has established a bona fide residence"' in a boycotting
country for legitimate business reasons,' it may be possible for that
resident or prospective resident to respond to boycott status questions if it does so from within the country and without consulting
the parent or other sources outside the country and does not provide
information about any United States person's race, religion, sex or
national origin. 7
(2) Gaps and Imperfections
(i) Information about a "Non-discrimination"Policy. While the
EAR severely limit the furnishing of information about a United
States person's business relations with a boycotted country in response to a boycott questionnaire, the EAR do not prohibit the
unilateral furnishing of all such information. Example (ix) of section
369.1(e) of the EAR 88 makes it clear that a United States person can
unilaterally notify a boycotting country that it has adopted an even11 EAR §§ 369.2(d)(4), 43 Fed. Reg. 3521 (1978); 369.2(d), Examples (iii), (iv), (viii) and
(ix), 43 Fed. Reg. 3521-22 (1978).
"I See notes 310-314 infra and accompanying text.
EAR § 369.4, Example (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978). See EAR § 369.2(d), Example (xii),
"'
43 Fed. Reg. 3522 (1978).
"I EAR § 369.4, Example (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978); EAR § 369.3(f-1), Examples (iii)
and (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3532 (1978).
"7 EAR § 369.3(f-1), Discrimination Against United States persons, Examples passim, 43
Fed. Reg. 3532-33 (1978).
' 43 Fed. Reg. 3517 (1978).
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handed business policy vis-a-vis boycotting and the boycotted country and in addition, supply the boycotting country with business
information to support its contention provided that the "intent" of
the person supplying the information is not to further or support the
boycott.
The recognition by the EAR of this limitation on the scope of the
EAA's furnishing information prohibition has considerable potential significance. Over the last several years certain domestic concerns have been approached by boycotting countries and boycott
offices not with requests to cease doing business with Israel but
rather with requests to establish in Arab countries facilities of
equivalent magnitude to the facilities maintained by the firms in
Israel. These requests suggest the possibility that United States
concerns could avoid blacklisting merely by following a policy of
nondiscrimination between the Arab world and Israel and certifying
to this fact.
However, the usefulness of this limitation on the information furnishing prohibition may be significantly reduced if the EAR continue to prohibit the furnishing of such information in response to
general boycott questionnaires.'8 9 Even if United States concerns
adopt a public non-discrimination policy vis-a-vis Israel and the
Arab world, these concerns are not apt to initate contact with a
boycotting country or boycott office to apprise them of this policy
in the hopes of quelling future boycott questionnaires. Such contacts might give rise to an investigation of the company by a boycott
office or a questionnaire from the government of a boycotting country or from a boycott office requesting additional information about
the policy. Response to such information requests are expressly prohibited by the EAA and EAR.
The distinction, then, in the EAR between unilaterally supplying
information of an even-handed policy to a boycott office and supplying such information in response to a questionnaire raises serious
practical problems for United States concerns that wish to do business in the Arab world. In addition, the distinction is not compelled
by logic, the EAA or its applicable legislative history.
The explanation given by the EAR for the distinction is set forth
in example (x) of section 369.1(e).' 90 This example creates a conclusive presumption that information, even with respect to nondiscri'"EAR § 369.1(e), Example (x), 43 Fed. Reg. 3517 (1978).
'90Id.
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mination in business relationships with Israel and the Arab world,
if supplied in response to a boycott questionnaire, must be supplied
with an "intent" to further or support the boycott. On the other
hand, such information supplied unilaterally may or may not be
supplied with the requisite intent.
This conclusive presumption is not supported by the EAA or its
legislative history.' 9 ' Nor does the EAR make any assertion, let
alone factual showing, that United States concerns which respond
to a boycott questionnaire always have boycott supportive intent
while those that unilaterally contact boycott offices do not.
Regardless of the form in which information about an evenhanded
boycott policy is delivered, such information about the company's
business policy should not be treated as the type of information, the
furnishing of which, the EAR seeks to prohibit. The boycott, which
Congress sought to interdict in the EAA, was a boycott injurious to
a friendly country and which has the effect of forcing United States
persons to cease operations in a friendly country in order to do
business elsewhere. Efforts by countries to achieve equal status with
others by attracting business to themselves rather than penalizing
firms for doing business elsewhere do not fall within the conduct
Congress sought to prohibit. Accordingly, example (x) should be
amended to eliminate the conclusive presumption. If this is not
done, one of the potentially most fruitful ways in which United
States concerns may develop a relationship with Arab countries and
still avoid participating in the boycott may be eliminated.
(ii) United States Persons Included in the Blacklist. As noted in
subsection IV.A.2.b.(2) of this article,'92 the EAR in at least two
instances unjustifiably favor some United States concerns over others on the basis of past business practices and arrangements. One
of these cases involves favoring United States business concerns
that have not been blacklisted.'93 While such bias in the EAR may
be unintended, absent a compelling argument in support of such a
result, the EAR should be amended to eliminate this result.
"I On the contrary, the SENATE RmoRT indicates that the "intent" requisite for a violation
of the EAA is not meant to be a mere formality but a requirement which must be met by
some factual proof. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 37.
"'
See notes 139-52 supra and accompanying text.
, The arguments in favor of giving a firm that is on the blacklist some right to correspond
with the boycott office, in order to obtain removal from the blacklist, support with equal force
permitting a United States concern that is under investigation by the boycott office rights to
correspond with the boycott office in order to prevent blacklisting, if possible.
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In the past a business concern seeking removal from the Arab
boycott blacklist has had to answer a number of questions posed by
the Central Boycott Office in Damascus, Syria as well as other local
.boycott offices. These questions have typically been about the boycotted concern's business relations with Israel. As noted above, a
responsive answer to these questions is certainly prohibited by the
EAR and any answer is in all probability prohibited.'94 Thus, it is
practically impossible for a domestic concern now on the blacklist
to be removed from it.
A business concern not now on the blacklist, including one that
was able to have itself removed prior to the effective date of the
EAR, may never be asked by a boycott office about its business
relationship with Israel. Further, the more the concern has favored
or currently favors Arab customers in its business dealings and the
more the concern has in the past complied with boycott requirements, the less likely it is to be asked questions in the future about
its business relationship with Israel.
Of course, the EAR cannot right this inequity by permitting a
domestic concern to supply information about its business relationship with Israel. However, the EAR need not presume, as it now
does, that contact with a boycott office must be for boycottsupportive purposes. Further, as discussed above, the EAR should
not prohibit a response to a boycott questionnaire which sets forth
a company's nondiscriminatory policy regarding its business relationships with the Arab world and Israel.
e.

Letters of Credit

(1)

Conclusions

(i) United States Commerce. Any discussion of letter of credit
transactions under the EAA and EAR must begin with a discussion
of United States commerce. The EAR posit, with respect to the
letter of credit prohibition, what might be called a "commerce plus"
test. While the EAR's provision discussing United States commerce
generally contains a commerce test for letters of credit,'9 5 an additional commerce-related criterion is set forth in the letter of credit
prohibition section itself.9 '
In order to fulfill the first United States commerce requisite, a
IgR
I"

See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
EAR § 369.1(d)(18) and (19), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978).

' EAR § 369.2(f)(6),

43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
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letter of credit must either be implemented by a United States
person located within the United States'9 7 or be implemented by a
United States person outside the United States and either (a) specify a United States address for the letter of credit beneficiary, (b)
call for documents indicating shipment from the United States, or
(c) call for documents indicating that the goods are of United States
origin.'9

The requisite contained in the letter of credit prohibition itself is
significantly more demanding. In accordance with these requirements, for a letter of credit to be in United States commerce, the
underlying transaction to which the letter of credit applies must be
in United States commerce and the letter of credit beneficiary must
be a United States person.' 9 This second United States commerce
test, peculiar only to letters of credit is clearly called for by the
EAR's legislative history. 00
In order to simplify a bank's determination as to whether the
business transaction underlying a letter of credit is in United States
commerce and whether the letter of credit beneficiary is a United
States person, the EAR set forth certain presumptions. 0 ' These
presumptions may be relied on by a United States bank implementing a letter of credit unless the bank is aware of facts that could
reasonably lead it to conclude otherwise. 02
Where the bank implementing the letter of credit is located in the
United States, the letter of credit transaction will be presumed to
be in United States commerce where the beneficiary has a United
States address. 0 3 The letter of credit transaction will be presumed
to be outside United States commerce so long as the credit does not
specify a United States address for the beneficiary.2 4
Where the bank implementing the letter of credit is located outside the United States, the letter of credit transaction will be presumed to be in United States commerce only (1) when the letter of
credit specifies a United States address for the beneficiary and (2)
when the letter of credit calls for documents indicating that the
goods to which the credit relates are of United States origin or will
"I EAR § 369.1(d)(18), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978).
I's EAR § 369.1(d)(19), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978).
EAR § 369.2(f)(6), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
SENATE

' EAR
M'

RFpoar, supra note 7, at 41.

§§ 369.2(f)(7), (8), (9), and (10), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).

EAR § 369.2(f)(7), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).

Id.
2" EAR § 369.2(f)(8), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
M
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be shipped from the United States."'5 Conversely, where the implementing bank is located outside the United States, the letter of
credit will be presumed not to be in United States commerce (1)
when the credit does not specify a United States address for the
beneficiary and (2) when the credit does not call for documents
indicating that the goods are of United States origin or will be
shipped from the United States.'"'
(ii) Conclusions Generally. The conclusions below demonstrate
the relevance of the letter of credit prohibition chiefly for United
States financial institutions which implement letters of credit. The
letter of credit prohibition is directed at such institutions and adds
no additional prohibitions affecting the behavior of United States
business concerns involved in letter of credit transactions. United
States business concerns involved in letter of credit transactions,
in order to avoid violating the EAA, must simply comply with the
EAA's other prohibitions relating to the furnishing of information
and refusing to do business. Further, the conclusions below assume
the existence of United States commerce as defined in the letter of
credit prohibition.
The letter of credit prohibition forbids a financial institution from
implementing a letter of credit that contains a requirement or condition, compliance with which is prohibited elsewhere in the EAA.2 07
Accordingly, in order to determine which letters of credit are prohibited, a bank must determine what actions by letter of credit beneficiaries would violate one of the other prohibitions of the EAA.
The EAR presume that any bank which routinely engages in letter of credit transactions involving the shipment of goods to a boycotting country knows that such letters of credit frequently contain
prohibited requirements. 28" Accordingly, a bank is unlikely to be
excused from accidentally implementing a prohibited letter of
credit, unless it has taken reasonable steps to prevent the implementation of such credits.20 9 Such reasonable steps are in part deter210
mined by standard banking practice.
While an inadvertant implementation of a prohibited letter of
credit may not constitute a violation of the EAA, once the error is
21 EAR § 369.2(f)(9), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
2

EAR § 369.2(0(10), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).

EAA
EAR
2 EAR
MIo
EAR

sec. 201, §
§ 369.1(e),
§ 369.1(e),
§ 369.1(e),

4A(a)(1)(F).
Examples (iv) and (v), 43 Fed. Reg. 3517 (1978).
Example (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3517 (1978).
Example (v), 43 Fed. Reg. 3517 (1978).
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discovered the prohibited letter of credit may not be further implemented."' However, the EAA and the EAR provide an "absolute
defense" to banks in any action brought to compel payment of or
for damages resulting from the failure to pay under a prohibited
2 2
letter of credit. 1
The letter of credit prohibition proscribes the "implementation"
of letters of credit that contain prohibited requirements and conditions.2 13 For purposes of the prohibition, the term implementation
includes: issuing, confirming, honoring, paying or negotiating payment under a letter of credit."' It does not include advising the
beneficiary of a prohibited letter of credit or taking the ministerial
21
actions necessary to dispose of such a credit.
Banks may advise a beneficiary of all the terms and conditions
of a prohibited letter of credit. Both banks and beneficiaries may
work individually or in concert to nullify or renegotiate the prohibited boycott terms of a letter of credit.21 1 If such terms are nullified
or adequately amended, the letter of credit may thereafter be fully
implemented." 7
(2)

Gaps and Imperfections

(i) Identification of ProhibitedLetters of Credit. The letter of
credit prohibition has presented banks with new and significant
burdens. A United States bank implementing a letter of credit
opened in an Arab country is now required to decide if the credit
contains any condition compliance with which is prohibited elsewhere in the EAA. If the letter of credit contains one or more such
condition, the bank must either refuse to implement the credit or
renegotiate the credit eliminating or amending the offending condition. Alone, this new requirement that each letter of credit be analyzed for prohibited boycott conditions is unlikely to stop banks
from implementing letters of credit with Arab countries and nationals and residents of Arab countries. Most large United States banks
have the capacity to provide trained personnel to screen letters of
credit for prohibited boycott terms. Nevertheless, the EAR could
still cause United States banks to severely curtail their letter of
2" EAR
212 EAR
213 EAR
211 EAR
215 EAR
215 EAR
217

Id.

§
§
§
§
§
§

369.2(f), Example (x), 43 Fed. Reg. 3524 (1978).
369.2(f)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
369.2(f)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
369.2(f)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
369.2(f)(4), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
369.2(f), Example (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3524 (1978).
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credit business with the Middle East if, due to ambiguities in the
EAR, letter of credit screening personnel are unable to screen
quickly and accurately all possibly tainted credits.
Even though a workmanlike set of regulations, the EAR do not
and cannot provide a clear and simple resolution of every boycottrelated problem. For United States banks to be able to rapidly and
precisely screen all letters of credit that might contain prohibited
boycott conditions and requirements, the Commerce Department
must provide a responsive mechanism through which United States
banks can expeditiously obtain an opinion as to whether or not a
particular letter of credit condition is prohibited. As will be discussed in section V, the mechanism for providing interpretive rulings already proposed by the Commerce Department is inadequate
for this purpose." 8
(ii) Duty to Inquire. The so-called United States "commerce
plus" test contained in the letter of credit prohibition of the EAR, 2 9
whereby a letter of credit to be subject to the EAR must not only
be in United States commerce itself but must also be issued in favor
of a beneficiary who is a United States person and involve an underlying transaction that is in United States commerce, contains a
number of presumptions which are designed to aid banks to rapidly
determine whether or not letters of credit are subject to the EAA.22 °
As noted above, this convenience is important. If letters of credit
from Arab countries are to remain a useful payments mechanism,
they must be reasonably inexpensive and thereby easily administered. A United States bank must quickly and accurately be able
to determine which letters of credit contain prohibited boycott
clauses and which do not.
Unfortunately, the EAR is not entirely clear regarding the extent
to which banks can actually rely on the United States commerce
presumptions mentioned above. The EAR emphasize that the presumptions may be rebutted by facts which could reasonably lead a
bank to conclude otherwise. 22' However, the EAR do not suggest
what these facts are, to what degree banks should be aware of these
facts, or whether banks have any affirmative duty to find these
facts.

'I'

See notes 349-50 infra and accompanying text.
EAR §§ 369.2(f)(7), (8), (9), and (10), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).

221

See notes 195-200 supra and accompanying text.
EAR §§ 369.2(0(7), (8), (9), and (10), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).

"
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A duty to look beyond the particular documents directly presented to a bank in each isolated letter of credit transaction conflicts
with the EAA's legislative history. 222 That history makes it clear
that Congress wanted the EAR to provide sufficient clarity for
banks to determine quickly and accurately whether or not the
United States commerce plus test did or did not subject a particular
letter of credit to the strictures of the EAA in order that EAR imprecisions not reduce otherwise permissible letter of credit business. 23
Accordingly, the EAR should be amended to make clear that a bank
has no affirmative duty in determining what letters are subject to
the letter of credit prohibition or to look beyond the letter of credit
documentation customarily presented in each transaction.
(iii) Acceptance of Non-complying Certifications.The EAR suggest that United States banks could be forced by letter of credit
beneficiaries to accept certificates to fulfill a boycott-related requirement other than those specified by the credit. Example (xiv)
of the letter of credit section permits a United States bank to implement a letter of credit wherein the beneficiary must certify he is not
blacklisted. 24 However, the example prohibits the United States
bank from demanding such a certificate to fulfill the letter of credit
requirement, reasoning that to permit a bank to demand such a selfcertification of non-blacklist status would be tantamount to permitting banks to deal only with non-blacklisted persons, something
clearly prohibited by the EAR.2 25 The example, thus, implies that
the beneficiary could require the bank to honor the credit regardless
of the certificate he delivers. A United States bank might thereby
be required to pay under a letter of credit on the basis of irregular
documentation which is insufficient to secure repayment of said
United States bank from the Arab bank that issued the credit.
Failure of the Arab bank to reimburse the United States bank due
to the inability of the United States bank to present those documents called for in the credit would be fully in accordance with the
normal rules applicable to the administration of international letter
of credit transactions.
The mischief which may be done to United States banks by example (xiv) may be compounded in at least two ways. First, if the
SENATE REPORT, supra
w Id.
-

212

note 7, at 42.

EAR § 369.2(f), Example (xiv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3524 (1978).
EAR § 369.2(a)(4), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978).
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Commerce Department were to decide that the rationale which permits exporters to issue certificates as to their own blacklist status
extends to the issuance of certificates regarding the blacklist status
of the exporters' affiliates,"' the Commerce Department could also
decide that the rationale that prohibits banks from demanding exporter self-certifications extends to blacklist status certifications
regarding exporter affiliates. United States banks could then further
be forced to accept additional noncomplying certificates which certificates they might find impossible to negotiate for repayment.
Second, example (vi) of the letter of credit section of the EAR12
suggests that United States banks may possibly be required to accept non-complying certificates other than those simply relating to
blacklist status. In that example, a United States bank confirms a
letter of credit containing a requirement for a negative certificate of
origin which, due to the effectiveness of the EAA, it can no longer
implement unless the exporter presents a nonconforming positive
certificate of origin in response to this requirement. While example
(vi) does suggest that in this case the United States bank has the
discretion to accept or reject the non-confirming tender, the example is not entirely clear on this point.
Putting banks in jeopardy of substantial financial losses for engaging in non-prohibited letter of credit transactions with the Arab
world runs counter to the spirit of the EAA22 1 and the EAA's legislative history2 9 which seek to hold banks harmless for compliance
with the EAA. It also appears to run counter to both the spirit and
the letter of a provision in the EAR which also generally attempts
to hold banks harmless from implementing prohibited boycott0
related credits .23

226 For a discussion arguing that the extension of the rationale permitting an exporter to
certify to his own blacklist status to certifications regarding the blacklist status of affiliates
is plausible if not compelling, see notes 108-12 supra and accompanying text.
227 EAR § 369.2(f), Example (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3524. While the EAA's hold harmless clause
specifically relates to the letter of credit provision, only the history of the clause suggests that
Congress intended the broadest possible interpretation of the clause.
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1)(F).

SENATE REPORT,

supra note 7, at 42.

"Compliance with this section shall provide an absolute defense in any action
brought to compel payment of, honoring of, or other implementation of a letter of
credit, or for damages resulting from failure to pay or otherwise honor or implement
the letter of credit." EAR § 369.2(f)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
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f. Evasion
(1) Conclusions
In consonance with the EAA,2 3 1 the EAR13 contain a broadly

worded prohibition on actions taken either independently or
through any other person with intent to evade the provisions of the
EAA. Evasion may occur through the diversion to foreign affiliates
of the business of a United States exporter, where that diversion is
effected to place one or more transactions outside United States
commerce and .thereby enable some boycott-related action or actions to be taken by the affiliate which the resident exporter itself
is prohibited from taking. 33 Diversionary evasion may occur when
particular orders are diverted by a United States firm to its foreign
affiliates in the face of actual or anticipated boycott demands.3

4

On

the other hand, one example in the EAR indicates that resourcing
the manufacturing of products for a region from the United States
to foreign affiliates because the United States firm could not engage
in trade consistent with the EAA prohibitions would not be considered evasion, presumably because this involves significant business
changes which demonstrate that boycott considerations could not
be the sole motivating factor.

35

Thus, diversions of specific orders

are inherently suspect. Resourcing business generally is probably
legal where the boycott is not the sole motivating factor.131
Evasion may also occur where foreign unrelated third parties are
interposed between the exporter and an Arab customer so that the
third party, not a United States person, will be in a position to take
whatever boycott-associated actions may be necessary, action which
the exporter itself may not lawfully take.

37

In these circumstances

not only the diversion of particular sales from direct to indirect
third-party transactions, but the interposition of dealers or distributors for a product line or lines with respect to a region, may be
considered evasion where the objective is to permit the taking of
m, EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(6).
23 EAR § 369.4, 43 Fed. Reg. 3524-35 (1978).
EAR § 369.4, Example (viii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
2
Id.
EAR § 369.4, Example (vii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
23 See discussion at notes 58 to 59 supra and accompanying text regarding meaning of
"intent" in the evasion standard.
131 EAR § 369.4, Examples (iii) and (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
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actions by third parties which the exporter is prohibited from tak23 8
ing.
In certain cases, restructuring transactions or business arrangements so that they fall within the scope of one or more of the exceptions of the EAA's boycott prohibitions should not be considered
evasion so long as the new arrangements are bona fide.2 31 Thus, for
example, it should be possible for old oi new Arab customers or old
or new distributors or dealers in Arab countries to make use of the
unilateral selection exception to designate particular suppliers of
goods, carriers, insurers or suppliers of other services. On the other
hand, an exporter would not be free of risk of evasion in establishing
a new local office or branch to function as an importer in an Arab
country and make use of the local law and unilateral selection exceptions. 20 The risk that this would be deemed to be evasion (or
would not constitute bona fide residence for purposes of satisfying
the unilateral selection and local law compliance exceptions) would
appear to be significant, unless it could be established that there
was a need for the local facility apart from its usefulness in making
such selections.
It should also be noted that neither the EAR nor the EAA or its
legislative history give any indication that a restructuring of a business arrangement so that there is no prohibited boycott actions or
agreement by any party to the transaction constitutes evasion. For
example, it should also be permissible to establish a multi-country
distributor in an Arab country which could import consistent with
the unilateral selection exception and re-export to other Arab countries, provided the distributor does not give negative certifications
or otherwise take actions within the scope of the EAA prohibitions
in connection with its re-exportation.
(2)

Gaps and Imperfections

(i) Theory of Evasion. The EAR have failed to adopt a sufficiently clear test for evasion. Evasion essentially involves the use of
contrivances or artifices to accomplish what would otherwise be an
unlawful act.2 4 ' In the context of the antiboycott prohibitions, evasion quite properly may encompass, for example, a United States
23A

Id.

-9 EAR § 369.4(b), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1978).
EAR § 369.4, Example (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
"I Distinctive Theatres of Columbus, Inc. v. Looker, 165 F. Supp. 410, 411 (S.D. Ohio
1958); see Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 487 (1945).
21
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person's use of a dummy foreign company, nominally owned by
others but under the dominion of the United States person, to provide negative certifications which the United States person himself
could not lawfully provide. 4 It might also involve the routing of a
particular shipment through an intermediary solely for the purpose
of avoiding the prohibitions."'
On the other hand, the term evasion should not encompass bona
fide changes in business relationships which obviate situations
where prohibited boycott activities might otherwise arise. It is incorrect, for example, to characterize as evasion a change from direct
selling to selling through bona fide independent distributors, irrespective of what those distributors may determine to do, of their
own volition, vis-a-vis the boycott. Likewise, it is not evasion if a
United States person establishes manufacturing, assembly, or warehousing facilities outside the United States, transactions from
which are outside the scope of United States commerce. The fact
that such actions may be motivated in some degree or even primarily by boycott considerations does not convert what is otherwise
lawful conduct into something prohibited.
The EAR, in limited measure, recognize that avoiding the impact
of a law by altering the business reality of a transaction is not
evasion. In so doing, they affirm an intent by the Commerce Department not to "freeze" business structures for dealing with Arab customers in the form they appeared on January 18, 1978.44 Thus, the
EAR provide that repeated use of exceptions will not be deemed to
be evasion. 5 Also, as noted above, the EAR recognize that United
States persons may establish residency in boycotting countries and
thus, avail themselves of the compliance with local law exception,
so long as the establishment of residency is motivated by legitimate
business considerations and does not have as its sole purpose the
avoidance of the EAA's prohibitions."
In example (vii) of section 369.4,47 the Commerce Department
goes so far as to acknowledge that if a United States concern can
no longer do business with a boycotting country because of the
effects of the EAA, the United States concern may shift all its
24

See EAR § 369.4(e), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).

243See EAR § 369.4, Example (iii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).

See notes 310-314 supra.
EAR § 369.4(b), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1978).
'" EAR § 369.4, Example (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
24

25

21

43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
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business to its controlled foreign subsidiary which can legally avoid
compliance with the EAA by manufacturing abroad all the goods to
be sold to the boycotting country. That is, in example (vii) the
Department does recognize, if only tacitly, that avoidance of the
EAA by altering the economic reality of the way business is conducted with a boycotting country is not evasion and that the desire
to continue business relations with a boycotting country is a sufficient "legitimate" business reason to justify the avoidance procedure.
However, the EAR do not maintain this approach throughout the
evasion section. In example (iv), 45 a company which had an established business relationship selling calculators directly to a boycotting country cannot continue to do so without violating the EAA.
Consequently, the company decides to sell its products to a distributor in a third country that in turn will almost certainly sell the
calculators to the boycotting country; the company's warranty will
continue to run with the product to the purchaser. Thus, in example
(iv), as in example (vii), to avoid the effects of the EAA and continue to sell its product a company changes the economic reality of
its business relationships with the boycotting country, but for an
undisclosed reason the Commerce Department has decided the behavior described in example (iv) constitutes evasion.
It is difficult to explain away example (iv) as simply an example
of a change in the structure of a business relationship devoid of
economic reality. Example (iv) in no way suggests that the foreign
distributor is not a bona fide business entity which makes a profit
on the transaction. Further, example (iii) of section 369.449 presents
a case of evasion where instead of selling the goods to a legitimate
foreign business entity which in turn resells them to customers in
the boycotting country, the United States company "merely arranges to have all future shipments run through a foreign corpora25 0
tion in a third country.
It is also difficult to find a practical justification for the distinction between example (iv) and example (vii). In finding that sales
by a United States-based company to a foreign distributor, which
in turn sells the goods to a boycotting country, constitute evasion
but manufacturing goods abroad by the foreign subsidiary of a
EAR § 369.4, Example (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
Id. (Emphasis added.)
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United States'concern does not, the EAR have in effect determined
that the only sanctioned way to avoid the effects of the EAA and
continue to sell goods to boycotting countries is to diminish manufacturing, and thus employment opportunities, in this country and
encourage manufacturing abroad, a result clearly not intended by
Congress. Accordingly, example (iv) destroys the most logical
framework within which the EAA's anti-evasion provision could
operate. What is more, example (iv) does so without establishing a
reasonable alternative.
This lack of clarity is regrettable. It is incumbent upon the Commerce Department to articulate better boundaries for the evasion
concept. Such a delineation is necessary on the basis of fundamental
concepts of fairness in the enforcement of a statute containing substantial civil and criminal penalties. It is necessary also to prevent
the evasion provision from having an unintended and inappropriate
in terrorem effect on a broad range of international business dealings. In the absence of an effective articulation of the scope of the
evasion provision in the regulations, it is not entirely clear whether
or not the courts will enforce the provision which is itself vaguely
worded.
B.

Doing Business within Boycotting Countries
1. Effect of Arab Boycott on Doing Business with the Arab
World
Prior to the effective date of the EAR, a significant number of
American companies were doing business in Arab countries.2 51Their
conduct was not subject to the reporting requirements of the Export
Administration Act, except in relation to transactions involving
export of goods or services from the United States and the American
company's parent or home office acted as the exporter.252 Like their
Arab counterparts, these companies and employees of these companies were subject to local laws and regulations including boycott
laws. The principal ways in which Arab customs, immigration and
boycott laws affected the business of United States companies doing
business or attempting to do business within a boycotting country
included: (a) registering to do business within the boycotting country, (b) obtaining work permits and visas for company employees,
25, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 65, at 29. See EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REP., note 68
supra, at 14; Samuelson, As the Oil Flows, So Flows the Trade, 9 NAT'L J. 161 (1977).
25 See notes 52 to 55 supra and accompanying text.
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and (c) importing goods and services for a company's own use or for
resale.
The EAA prohibitions and exceptions are specifically designed to
apply to these activities of United States persons in boycotting
countries whenever there exists a nexus with United States commerce. This nexus will often exist since goods or services (such as
those of architects or engineers) of United States origin are typically
ordered with regard to specific projects in the boycotting country or
because the home office or parent corporation provides nonancillary services for specific projects including bid or performance
bonding. Because contracts of a branch office may be deemed always to be guaranteed by the home office,' 53 all branch operations
in boycotting countries may be in United States commerce regardless of the origin of goods or other services provided to customers.
The discussion in this section assumes, therefore, the existence of
United States commerce and the analysis will not pertain where
United States commerce is not present.
In registering to do business within an Arab country, companies
are typically asked to certify that they are not blacklisted and that
they do not have certain kinds of business relationships with Israel
(licensing agreements, manufacturing plants, oil exploration contracts, and the like).254 In some countries companies have had to
agree not to deal with Israeli companies or have Israeli employees. 55
It is typical for United States companies doing business in an
Arab country to seek admission for employees who are United States
nationals. For a United States national to be employed in an Arab
country he must obtain a visa and a work permit. The issuance of
such visas and work permits is often conditioned upon the applicant
being neither a "Zionist" nor blacklisted.2 6 The term Zionist does
not appear to be uniformly defined in every Arab state. Being a
Zionist appears not to be synonomous with being Jewish, although
it seems that in the actions of most Arab immigration authorities
the correlation between the two is quite high.37
2"

See notes 47 to 51 supra and accompanying text.

"' See note 2 supra.

Id.
See League of Arab Countries, General Secretariat, Head Office for the Boycott of Israel,
General Principles for Boycott of Israel, June 1972.
"7 See, DiscriminatoryArab Pressureon U.S. Business: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
International Trade and Commerce of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) (statement of Henry Waxman); Hearings on S. 69 and S. 92 Before
255
2
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The importation of United States origin goods and services into
an Arab country by a United States concern resident within an Arab
country involves many of the same requirements and potentially
many of the same EAA prohibitions regarding the furnishing of
information and selection of suppliers, carriers and insurers that are
faced by United States firms exporting to an Arab country. Because
as many United States concerns resident within Arab countries
have in the past relied on United States origin imports, to in effect
prohibit these exports by prohibiting the concerns from complying
with local Arab law would have serious if not catastrophic effects
on the concerns' business. However, if certain specific criteria are
met, the United States concern resident in a boycotting country
may take advantage of the EAA's exception for compliance with
local law158 as well as that dealing with unilateral and specific selections. 5 9 These exceptions, then, become of great importance to
United States persons attempting to do business within the Arab
world.
Due to the importance and intricacies of the local law compliance
exception and unilateral selection exception, the remainder of this
section will be organized in slightly different fashions than the preceding discussions of export transactions. First, before proceeding to
a discussion of the practical effects of the EAA and EAR on operations within boycotting countries, it is helpful to explore in some
detail the local law compliance exception and its interrelation with
the exception for unilateral and specific selectionssu° Second, the
discussion of gaps and imperfections in the EAR will be integrated
with the conclusions regarding the compliance with local law and
unilateral selection exceptions and the application of the EAR to
doing business within boycotting countries generally and will not be
set out in separate subsections.
2. Elaboration of Compliance with Local Law and Unilateral
Selection Exceptions
a.

Compliance With Local Law

The local law compliance exception"' is available only if a resithe Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 174, 177-81 (1977) (statement of George Helland).
2", EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(C).
259EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F).
200 This exception is introduced and discussed at notes 156 to 175 supra and accompanying
text.

261 Compare EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F) with TRA Guidelines, H-3, H-4, 43 Fed. Reg.
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dency test is met and it is available for compliance with respect to
particular laws and activities. It does not pemit, under any circumstances, discrimination against United States persons on the basis
of race, religion, or national origin, or the furnishing of information
about the race, religion or national origin of any United States person or of any owner, director, officer or employee of a United States
person.62
Technically the exception also does not extend to discrimination
on the basis of sex or to the furnishing of such information." 3 However, the EAR acknowledge that sex discrimination is not an aspect
of the Arab boycott." 4 It is important to note that the EAR do not
preclude discrimination on the basis of nationality or the providing
of information about a person's nationality, as distinct from national origin. 5
b.

Bona Fide Local Residence

In order to avail himself of the local law compliance exception, a
United States person must qualify as a bona fide resident of the
boycotting country.6 The EAR adopt quite a flexible posture toward this residency test. A number of factors, no one of which is
dispositive, will be applied to evaluate the bona fides of a person's
residence including: (i) physical presence in the boycotting country;
(ii) whether residence is needed for legitimate business reasons; (iii)
continuity of the residency; (iv) intent to maintain the residence;
(v) prior residence in the boycotting country; (vi) the size and nature of the person's presence in the country; (vii) whether the person
is registered to do business or incorporated in the country; (viii)
whether the person (individual) has a valid work visa; and (ix)
whether the person has a similar presence in both boycotting and
non-boycotting countries in connection with similar business activities.267
Residency need not be permanent in order to qualify. In the case
3462-63 (1978). The TRA contains no equivalent exception and the Treasury Department has
interpreted agreements to comply generally with laws of boycotting countries to constitute
boycott participation for federal income tax purposes.
2I EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(3), EAR § 369.3(f-2)(10), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
23

Id.

EAR § 369.2(c), Example (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3521 (1978).
NS EAR § 369.2(b), Example (iii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3520 (1978); EAR § 369.2(c), 43 Fed. Reg.
3520 (1978).
" EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F).
"' EAR § 369.3(f)(3)(i)-(ix), 43 Fed. Reg. 3531 (1978).
24
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of a business firm, residency is established by a branch office, project office or other facility in the boycotting country which will
operate there on a continuing basis or for the life of a local project,
2
such as the construction of a power plant or dam. 11
c.

ParticularLaws and Activities

The local law compliance exception pertains only to compliance
with host country laws, whether derived from statutes, regulations,
decrees, or other official sources having the effect of law in the host
country. 2 9 It does not allow compliance with presumed policies of
the host country not reflected in official sources having the force of
law. It is in this respect more narrow than the other exceptions of
the EAA which address themselves to boycotting country
"requirements" rather than laws. 2 0 There are two distinct parts to
the local law compliance exception, one dealing with activities
"exclusively within" the host country and the other dealing with
activities involving imports into the boycotting country.
(i) Activities "Exclusively Within" the Host Country. A United
States person that is a bona fide resident of a boycotting country
will not violate the EAA if he complies or agrees to comply with the
laws of that country regarding his activities "exclusively within"
that country.2 ' This portion of the local law compliance exception
is mandatory under the EAA whereas the local import law compliance portion is entirely discretionary with the Secretary. 2 The exception for activities exclusively within the boycotting country is,
however, of highly limited practical effect.
"' See EAR § 369.3(f), Examples of Bona Fide Residency, passim, 43 Fed. Reg. 3531-32
(1978).
2' EAR § 369.3(f)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3531 (1978).
270 See, e.g., EAR § 369.3(b), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978), allowing certain compliance with
import and shipping document "requirements" of a boycotting country and EAR § 369.3(e),
43 Fed. Reg. 3530 (1978), allowing certain compliance by individuals with immigration, visa
and passport "requirements" of boycotting countries.
"I EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F). This provision is elaborated in the EAR at § 369.3(f-1) and
accompanying examples, 43 Fed. Reg. 3532-33 (1978).
271 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F). According to the EAR the local import law portion "will
be monitored and continually reviewed to determine whether its continued availability is
consistent with the national interest. Its availability may be limited or withdrawn as appropriate. In reviewing the continued availability of this exception, the effect that the inability
to comply with local import laws would have on the economic or other relations of the United
States with boycotting countries will be considered." EAR § 369.3(f-2)(9), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533
(1978).
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While it permits agreements to comply with a boycotting country's law with regard to activities exclusively within that country,
more general agreement to comply with host country laws is not, in
and of itself, a prohibited action.213 Thus, arguably, the exception is
less permissive than the corresponding rule. The single, significant
practical effect of the "actions exclusively within" portion of the
local law compliance exception is that it allows furnishing of otherwise prohibited information about business relations with Israel or
blacklisted firms, so long as the information is furnished within the
Arab country, by a United States person on the basis of his own
knowledge without recourse to outside sources of information. 274 It
would not appear, however, to allow furnishing of boycott-related
information such as negative certifications, in the context of an
import transaction, since the information furnishing will probably
be viewed as a portion of the import activity and not as an activity
exclusively within? 57 While, as a theoretical matter, it will allow
United States persons who are bona fide residents in boycotting
countries to exclude from selection blacklisted in-country suppliers
of goods and services, it is doubtful whether any blacklisted firms
offer goods or services within boycotting countries.
(ii) Local Import Law. The import law portion of the local law
compliance exception while discretionary and therefore subject to
withdrawal by the Secretary, is of considerably greater practical
significance than the portion dealing with activities exclusively
within boycotting countries. However, its practical effects have
been significantly, and unnecessarily, reduced by a determination
by the Commerce Department that it applies only to the import of
goods and not services."'
This portion of the exception allows a United States person that
is a bona fide resident of a boycotting country to comply or agree to
comply with local import laws with regard to importation of goods
into that country provided (A) the goods are for such person's own
use within the host country, and (B) in the normal course of business the goods are identifiable as to source or origin at the time of
213 According to the EAR § 369.2(a)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978), such general local law
compliance agreements do not constitute a prohibited agreement to refuse to do business with
a boycotted country or blacklisted persons.
2'
See discussion at notes 338 to 341 infra and accompanying text.
Is
Id.
'7' EAR § 369.3(f-2)(8), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978). See discussion at notes 284 to 296 infra
and accompanying text. Its practical value may be further reduced by the fact that initiation
of such selections may give rise to antitrust prosecution. See discussion at note 10 supra.
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entry into the host country.27 7
Goods are for the United States person's own use if: (A) they
are to be consumed by the United States person; (B) they are to
remain in such person's possession and to be used by such person;
(C) they are to be used by such person in performing contractual
services for another; (D) they are to be further manufactured, incorporated into, refined into, reprocessed into another product to
be manufactured for another; or (E) they are to be incorporated
into or permanently affixed as a functional part of a project to be
constructed for another.27 Neither goods that are acquired to fill an
order for another person nor goods acquired for retail sale from
inventory qualify. 79
To be identifiable as to source in the normal course of business
when imported into a boycotting country, goods must be identifiable by (A) trademark, trade name, symbol or other identification
normally on the product itself or its packaging, or (B) by uniqueness
of design or appearance.2 80 Goods identifiable as to source solely by
means of import documentation will not qualify for the exception.,'
The most obvious application of the import law portion of the
local law compliance exception is to permit a United States person
resident in a boycotting country to select suppliers of identifiable
goods to be imported for that person's own use. It would appear that
such selections may be made in either positive or negative or exclusionary terms, for example, by refusing to deal with blacklisted
firms or by the use of "blacklists" or "whitelists" (lists of acceptable
firms) in seeking bids for the supply of specifically identifiable
goods. On the other hand, the practical benefits of this portion of
the exception are circumscribed because it does not appear to extend to the furnishing of import-related information, such as negative certifications, with regard to goods selected for import in compliance with local import law.282 Likewise it may not permit the
issuance, confirmation or acceptance of import-financing letters of
I77EAR § 369.3(f-2)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
EAR § 369.3(f-2)(6), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
EAR § 369.3(f-2)(7), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978). The EAR provide an exception to this
requirement that goods not be imported for resale with regard to goods to be sold in a
company employee canteen or commissary. They will be considered to be for the consumption
of the importing person and not for resale and thus they qualify for the exceptions. EAR §
369.3(f-2) Imports For a U.S. Person's Own Use, Example (ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1978).
-' EAR § 369.3(f-2)(1)(ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
" EAR § 369.3(f-2)(4), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 and EAR § 369.3(c)(17), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
See notes 338 to 341 infra and accompanying text.
"'
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credit requiring or conditioned upon such certifications."'
Further, and perhaps of greatest potential significance, it does not
permit boycott-based selection of providers of services for import." 4
A boycott-based selection of carrier or freight insurer would similarly fall outside the scope of the local import law compliance exception.28 5 Thus, a United States person resident in an Arab country is
chargeable with violating the EAA's prohibition against refusing to
do business, if in compliance with the Arab country's law he chooses
a non-blacklisted United States architect, engineer, freight insurer
or other provider of services.
This anomaly in the treatment by the EAR of goods and services
is not only confusing and an impediment to business operations in
the Arab countries, it also contradicts the legislative scheme of the
EAA and explicit legislative history. The EAA states unequivocally
that a United States person may comply with a selection of a supplier of services (even if the slection is boycott-based) made by a
United States person resident in a boycotting country.2 88 While the
local law compliance exception of the EAA is not entirely unambiguous on the question of whether the import law compliance exception extends to services,2 7 it may and should have been thus construed, in the light of the clear scope of the complementary unilateral selection exception, in order to give the statutory scheme integrity.
Although the EAA can and should be interpreted, consistent with
its wording, to allow selection of suppliers of services by United
States persons resident in boycotting countries, any basis for hesitation in this regard by the Commerce Department should have been
eliminated by a review of the legislative history of the unilateral
selection and local law compliance exceptions.
The Senate version of the Export Administration Amendments of
1977, S. 69, as reported by the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 288 contained a serious discontinuity be'

Id.
See notes 286 to 294 infra and accompanying text.
329 to 332 infra and accompanying text.
201, § 4A(a)(2)(C). This exception as implemented by the EAR is discussed

20 See notes
21S EAA sec.

at notes 156 to 175 supra and accompanying text.
21
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F) provides, in pertinent part: "[Sluch rules and regulations
may contain exceptions for such resident complying with the laws or regulations of [the
boycotting countryl governing imports into such country . . . specifically identifiable products . . . for his own use, including the performance of contractual services within that
country. . ....
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7.
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tween the two exceptions. The unilateral selection exception stated
that United States persons resident in boycotting countries were
excluded from the category of persons with whose unilateral selections of suppliers of goods and services, United States persons could
comply. 29 The compliance with local law exception was designed to
permit United States persons resident in boycotting countries to
comply with local law in the import of goods and services.2 90 Thus,
while the latter would allow implementing regulations to permit
unilateral and specific selections of suppliers of goods and services
by United States residents of boycotting countries, the former would
have proscribed compliance by United States persons with such
selections.
A principal purpose of the Business Roundtable participants in
the extra-legislative negotiations with representatives of the major
Jewish organizations, at this stage of the legislative process, was to
remedy this discontinuity by eliminating the exclusion of the
United States persons from the class of persons with whose selections compliance was to be permitted. The outcome of these negotiations was reflected in floor amendments proposed in the Senate
by Senator Heinz,2"' whereby the unilateral selection provision was
amended by eliminating the exclusion of United States persons resident in boycotting countries from the category of persons with whose
selections United States persons could lawfully comply. 22 In describing the amendment, Senator Heinz indicated that he believed
that the amended version of the unilateral selection exception governed the conduct of those making selections as well as that of the
recipients of such selections. He explained that the new provision
differed from that of S. 69 as reported, "in that it permits a unilateral selection by a U.S. person resident in a foreign country" and
that both "S. 69 and [the] amendment permit unilateral selections
from the same range of products and services.1 293 Senator Heinz's
remarks would seem to demonstrate an unequivocal legislative intent to permit selection of suppliers of services by United States
persons resident in boycotting countries.
At the same time, an amendment was made to the compliance
with local law exception in order to accommodate debate between
" Id. at 62.
" Id. at 46.

123 CONG. REc. S7152-54 (daily ed. May 5, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Heinz).
292

Id.

21

123 CONG. REC. S7153 (daily ed. May 5, 1977).
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the Jewish organizations and the Business Roundtable pertaining to
the proper scope of the exception with regard to the import of goods.
The Jewish organizations apparently had feared that this exception,
as previously stated in S. 69 whereby boycotting country residents
could import United States goods and services on a boycott basis
for resale, could be so broadly construed as to swallow the rule
against boycott-based refusals to deal.29 ' The Roundtable apparently wanted to make certain that goods needed for construction
projects would qualify for the exception. The result was addition of
language stating that to qualify for the exception, imported goods
must be for the United States person's "own use, including the
performance of contractual services in that country.''295
Nothing in the legislative record indicates an intent by the Senate
to constrict the previous scope of the exception so as to eliminate
services from the ambit of the compliance with local import law
exception. In fact, the record clearly shows the opposite. Senator
Heinz explained that the amendment to the local law compliance
selection represented a "narrowing," because of the language with
regard to "one's own use.'' 9 9 He did not state that the amendment
was designed to limit selections made in compliance with local import law to goods and not services. It seems fair to conclude that if
this change were intended, Senator Heinz would have specifically
addressed such a significant further "narrowing" of S. 69. From the
foregoing analysis, it seems clear that either the Senate intended the
unilateral selection exception to enable unilateral selections of providers of services by United States persons (this was apparently Senator Heinz's impression) or the Senate intended the amendment to
the local law compliance section to deny United States persons
resident in boycotting countries the right to make selections of suppliers of services.
The impact of the Commerce Department's erroneous construction of the local law compliance exception's application to the import of services may be mitigated by use of certain contract provisions so long as these provisions are not deemed to constitute evasion. As noted earlier in this Article, the EAR, while generally proscribing the use of "risk of loss" provisions with respect to importation of goods,297 allow use of contract conditions requiring suppliers
294

Id.

29 Id.

Id.
Is
"'

See notes 143 to 149 supra and accompanying text.
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to make delivery and pass title to goods on an "in country" basis."'
It is not unreasonable to conclude on the basis of the EAR's treatment of delivery of goods that a United States firm resident in a
boycotting country could require prospective contractors to provide
evidence of their qualifications to perform services in the boycotting
country. Acceptance of a bid could be conditioned upon the successful bidder obtaining entry to the boycotting country for its personnel. However, the EAR offer no specific guidance on the legality of
such a contractual scheme. Unless or until the Commerce Department provides such guidance by way of interpretation of or additions to the EAR, a firm doing business in boycotting countries will
probably be well advised to use such a scheme, only if such arrangements are a normal, worldwide commercial practice by the firm or
the industry of which it is part.
d.

Unilateral Selection Exception

The unilateral selection exception has a dual significance for
United States firms conducting operations in boycotting countries.
First, a United States firm itself, either through its local office or
through its offices and facilities outside the country, may comply
with qualifying unilateral selections made by any bona fide resident
of the boycotting country. 99 Second, other United States persons
may comply with qualifying unilateral selections emanating from a
local resident office of the United States firm. 0
The unilateral selection exception covers what a United States
person may do to carry out a selection made by another and does
not apply to the legality of the origination of the selection itself.',
If the person originating the selection is a United States person, the
selection must meet the criteria of the local law compliance exception. 102 The unilateral selection and local law compliance exceptions
are similar but, as suggested by the foregoing analysis of the treatment of selection of services under the local law compliance exception, they are not identical in scope.
Under both exceptions, to be lawful the selection must originate
"I EAR § 369.4, Example (xiv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978). See notes 150 to 151 supra and
accompanying text.
r" EAR § 369.3(c) passim.
EAR § 369.3(c), Boycotting Country Buyer, Example (ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3529 (1978).
1"' EAR § 369.3(c)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
M2

Id.
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with a bona fide resident of the importing boycotting country. 3 ,
Under both exceptions any goods which are selected must in the
normal course of business be identifiable by source when imported.3 4 Neither exception applies if the person initiating or receiving the selection knows that the purpose of the selection is to discriminate against any United States person on the basis of race,
religion, or national origin.3 5 But only the unilateral selection exception extends to the selection of services to be performed in whole
or in part within the boycotting country0 6 and to the selection of
goods not intended for the use of the importer.0
The EAR are flawed in that they do not adequately spell out the
interrelations of these two exceptions and the varying legal obligations their dissimilarity may impose on persons subject to the EAA.
The following can be concluded from a prudent reading of the EAR.
Where the selection originates with a United States person's resident office in a boycotting country and the selection also is carried
out by a United States person, both exceptions must be available;
that is, the implementing person should not carry out a unilateral
and specific selection of goods if the selection does not meet the
"own use" requirement of the local import law compliance exception, and he should not carry out a selection of supplier of services
to be performed in whole or in part in the boycotting country. In
other words, the scope of the selection will be limited to activities
common to both exceptions. Even where the originating and implementing parties are independent United States persons, each must
take care not to encourage or assist the other to act beyond the scope
of the exception available to the other, as such encouragement could
constitute unlawful aiding and abetting or evasion.3 8 A United
313 EAR § 369.3(c)(7), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978) and EAR § 369.3(f)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3531
(1978).
"I EAR § 369.3(c)(16), 43 Fed. Reg. 3528 (1978).
3*1EAR § 369.3(c)(18), 43 Fed. Reg. 3528 (1978) and EAR § 369.3 (f-2)(10), 43 Fed. Reg.
3533 (1978).
See notes 284 to 296 supra and accompanying text.
30 Goods selected in compliance with local import law must be for the use of the United
States resident importing the goods, EAR § 369.3(f-2)(1)(i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978). This
test is amplified in notes 278 to 279 supra and accompanying text.
"
The evasion section of the EAR states:
No United States person may engage in any transaction or take any other action,
either independently or through any other person, with intent to evade the provisions of this Part. Nor may any United States person assist another United States
person to violate or evade the provisions of this Part.
EAR § 369.4(a), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1978) (emphasis added).
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States person receiving an apparently boycott-based unilateral and
specific selection of a supplier of services is probably under no duty
to inquire as to whether its originator is a United States person. 09
3. Application of the EAA and EAR to Operations of United
States Persons within Boycotting Countries
The following analysis applies the prohibitions and exceptions of
the EAA as elaborated in the EAR to the establishment and conduct
of business operations in Arab countries participating in the boycott
of Israel. The analysis assumes throughout that the activities described are in United States commerce.
a.

Establishinga Bona Fide Residence

A United States person without a bona fide residence in a boycotting country may establish such a residence (and thereby become
eligible for the local law compliance exception and to initiate unilateral selections with which United States persons may comply) so
long as he has a legitimate business need to do so. Residence established solely for purposes of avoiding application of the EAA's prohi310
bitions will not be deemed to be bona fide.
A person seeking to establish bona fide residence may furnish
otherwise prohibited, nondiscriminatory information regarding
business relations with a boycotted country or with blacklisted persons, if such information is required by law of the boycotting country in order to establish a branch or subsidiary therein. 31 1 The information may only be furnished, however, by employees of the United
States person based upon their own knowledge while they are within
the boycotting country. 2 The EAR's examples point out that a
United States person's employees visiting a boycotting country to
prepare a bid on a construction project are not bona fide residents
Also applicable is the general aiding and abetting provision of the Commerce Department's
Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 387.2 (1977).
:"I As a general matter, the EAR do not explicitly impose any duty of inquiry on recipients
of unilateral selections of suppliers of goods or services, except where the recipient is advised
of the selection by a person outside the boycotting country. In this instance the recipient must
inquire whether the selection originated in the boycotting country. He may accept the assurances of the conveyor of the selection without further inquiry. EAR § 369.3(c)(11), 43 Fed.
Reg. 3527 (1978).
, EAR § 369.3(c)(8) and § 369.3(f)(3), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527, 3531 (1978).
"'
EAR § 369.3(f) Bona Fide Residency, Examples (iv) and (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3531 (1978).
The "flexibility" of the EAR on the point is intended to prevent freezing the status quo at
the date of effectiveness of the EAR (January 18, 1978). Id.
:112 Id.
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and may not furnish prohibited information required to be submitted with the bid." 3 However, personnel of a United States company,
not previously resident in a boycotting country, sent to the boycotting country to set up operations after their employer has been
awarded a construction contract, are construed to be bona fide residents and, as such, may furnish nondiscriminatory boycott information necessary to the establishment of operations.3 14
b. Compliance with Immigration, Passport, Visa or Employment Requirements of a Boycotting Country
An individual employee of a firm establishing or conducting operations in a boycotting country may comply or agree to comply with
the immigration, passport, visa or employment requirements of a
boycotting country to the extent of furnishing information about the
race, religion, sex, nationality or national origin of himself and
members of his immediate family. 15 A firm may not furnish racial,
religious, or national origin information about its executives or employees. It may, however, furnish information about the nationalities and sex of its employees. It may also perform certain administrative actions, on a nondiscriminatory basis, to facilitate completion of applications by individuals, even though those applications
may contain information (supplied by the employee) about race,
religion or national origin. Employers may inform employees of host
country visa requirements and provide typing, translation, messenger and other similar services. Employers may transmit visa applications to the host country's consulate and may urge their expeditious processing.3 1
The fact that certain employees may be denied entry to the host
country for boycott reasons need not prevent an employer from proceeding with the establishment of a branch or subsidiary or the
carrying out of a project using others in the place of those denied
entry. However, an employer may not agree to exclude persons
based on race, religion or national origin, nor may he select out
employees in advance to eliminate those who are expected to be
denied entry, on the basis of race, religion or national origin. 17 The
"

Id. Example (v).
Id. Example (xii).
EAR § 369.3(e)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3530 (1978).
3,6 EAR § 369.3(e)(3), 43 Fed. Reg. 3530 (1978).
", To do so would violate the EAA's prohibitions against taking discriminatory actions,
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1)(B).
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EAR do not state whether an employer may condition an offer of
employment upon the applicant's ability to obtain an entry visa or
work permit. Such a condition should be permitted. By way of analogy, the EAR permit a condition in a purchase contract that title
to goods not pass until they have been delivered into a boycotting
country. :""
c.

Importing Goods into a Boycotting Country

(i) Selection of Suppliers of Goods. Personnel of a bona fide
resident branch, subsidiary or other office of a United States person
in a boycotting country may make boycott-based, direct choices of
suppliers of goods for import into the boycotting country so long as
they meet the identifiability '9 and "one's own use" 2 ' tests of the
local import law compliance exception.2 ' Though the EAR do not
specify the permissible means for making such selections, it seems
fair to conclude that they may be made by placing orders or seeking
bids only from firms which are not blacklisted or by refusing bids
322
of blacklisted firms.
Similarly, employees of a United States person resident in a boycotting country may initiate boycott-based, but nondiscriminatory,
choices to be carried out by third parties of suppliers of goods so long
as the criteria of the local import law compliance exception are met.
If the person requested to implement the selection is a United States
person, including the home office or parent of the person initiating
the selection, it must meet the criteria of the unilateral selection
exception.12:1 In such circumstances, the United States home office
or parent probably can provide so-called "pre-award" assistance in
the form of lists of potential suppliers and their qualifications without identification of blacklist status and without excluding blacklisted firms, but the selection of a specific supplier must be made
by the resident of the boycotting country. 324 However, in order to

"IThe Treasury Department guidelines implementing the TRA antiboycott provisions
explicitly sanction such an entry visa employment condition. See TRA Guidelines, note 85
supra, H-10 and H-11, 43 Fed. Reg. 3463 (1978).
311 See notes 280 to 281 supra and accompanying text.
"" See notes 278 to 279 supra and accompanying text.
321 EAR § 369.3(f-2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
311 Suppliers may not be excluded, however, on the basis of the race, religious affiliation or
national origin of the supplier or its owners, management or other personnel. See note 262
supra and accompanying text.
121EAR § 369.3(c), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526-28 (1978). For a discussion of these criteria see notes
156 to 175 supra and accompanying text.
I2 The EAR state as a general proposition that, unless a selection meets the criteria of the
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qualify, such provision of "pre-award" or "pre-selection" services
must be customary for the United States parent or home office (or
the industry of which it is part) in non-boycotting as well as boy2
cotting countries.1 1
Also, a United States person resident in a boycotting country may
carry out a boycott-based unilateral and specific selection of a supplier of identifiable goods, originated by a boycotting country customer, including another United States person that is a resident of
that country. Here again the provision of qualifying pre-award assistance by the United States person to the boycotting country customer will not taint the selection. 2 6 If the selection is initated by
another United States person resident in the boycotting country, it
is necessary that the goods of the designated supplier be for the
use3 27 of the person initiating the selection. If the recipient of the
selection knows or has reason to know that the goods are not for the
use of the United States person originating the selection, the recipient may be charged with evasion or aiding and abetting if he imple3 28
ments the selection.
(ii) Selection of Carriersand Insurers. While the EAR's local law
compliance and unilateral selection exceptions provide considerable
scope for boycott-based selection of suppliers of goods for import
into boycotting countries, they circumscribe conduct of United
States persons resident in boycotting countries, in the selection of
providers of certain services necessary in the conveyance of the selected goods to the boycotting country. This anomaly results from
the Commerce Department's insistence on excluding selections of
suppliers of services from the ambit of the local law compliance
exception. 32 Under the EAR a United States person resident in a
boycotting country can make a selection of a carrier from among
unilateral and specific selection exception, a United States person will be guilty of an unlawful refusal to do business if it provides "post award" services (such as negotiating a contract
with a supplier of goods selected by the client) when it knows or has reason to know that the
client selection was boycott-based. This general proposition is true whether or not the United
States person provided "pre-award assistance." EAR § 369.2(a)(7), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978).
", EAR § 369.2(a)(6), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978).
3, See notes 324 to 325 supra and accompanying text.
32, See notes 307 to 308 supra and accompanying text.
328 Id.
I" See notes 284 to 296 supra and accompanying text. Selection of carriers and insurers
with regard to import transactions does not appear to be an activity "exclusively within" a
boycotting country and as a selection of services it does not qualify under the local import
law portion of the local law compliance exception. EAR § 369.3(f), 43 Fed. Reg. 3531 (1978).
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those permitted to call at ports in the boycotting country3 0 A
United States person may make such boycott-based selection of
eligible carriers directly. Alternatively, he probably can request a
third party to implement the selection.331 He may not, however,
initiate a boycott-based selection of a non-blacklisted freight insurer
or other provider of services necessary to complete the transaction,
since such selections are clearly proscribed selections of services not
.10

EAR § 369.2(a) Refusals to Do Business, Example (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978). This

altogether salutary example conveys a recognition by the Department of Commerce that only
non-blacklisted vessels may carry goods to Arab ports and that United States firms should
not be placed in jeopardy of a prosecution for refusal to do business simply by virtue of
compliance with the practical imperatives of shipment of goods to boycotting countries.
While this treatment of choices of carriers is perhaps not compelled by the logic of the EAA
("discriminating" against blacklisted carriers is no different than "discriminating" against
blacklisted suppliers), it is both exigent and practical.
To avoid confusion, the determination of the EAR, evidenced by Refusals to Do Business,
Example (iv), generally to permit boycott-based selection of carriers should be better integrated into the regulations as a whole. First, carrier selection should not be included in the
exclusion of services qualifications to the local import law compliance exception. If this is not
the case, the exception can be said to be more restrictive than the rule.
Second, the following example in the unilateral and specific selection exception section
should be altered:
A, a U.S. exporter, is asked by B, a U.S. person who is a bona fide resident of a
boycotting country Y, to ship goods on U.S. carrier C. C is not blacklisted by Y,
and A knows that B has chosen on a boycott basis in order to comply with Y's
boycott laws.
A may comply or agree to comply with B's request because B is a bona fide resident
of Y. EAR § 369.3(c) Boycotting Country Buyer, Example (i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3529
(1978).
This example seems unnecessary and potentially misleading. It is unnecessary since Refusal
to Do Business, Example (iv), states it is not a refusal to deal to make a boycott-based
selection of a carrier. Therefore, the local law compliance and unilateral selection exceptions
need not pertain. It is misleading because it implies that United States persons may comply
with boycott-based selections of providers of services initiated by other United States persons
resident in boycotting countries despite the EAR's clear proscription of such selections, although such compliance is culpable as evasion or aiding and abetting. See notes 308 to 309
supra and accompanying text.
But see note 105 supra and accompanying text: A United States person cannot certify that
a carrier is eligible to enter a boycotting country's ports or waters. A United States person
may only comply or agree to comply with host country requirements (i) prohibiting shipment
of goods in a carrier flying the flag of the boycotted country or which is owned, chartered,
based or operated by a boycotted country, its nationals or residents, and (ii) specifying that
the carrier not visit a port of a boycotted country en route or that it follow a prescribed route.
EAR § 369.3(a-2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3525 (1978). It may also certify compliance with such a
"precautionary" or "war risk" requirement, EAR § 369.3(b)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
0" Since the EAR's treatment of such carrier selections is extraordinary, see note 330 supra,
it may be argued that only direct selection of carriers will be permitted. This interpretation
is, however, difficult or impossible to square with EAR § 369.3(c) Boycotting Country Buyer,
Example (i), reprinted in note 330 supra.
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covered by the local law compliance exception.32 1
A United States person resident in a boycotting country may
carry out a boycott-based, unilateral and specific selection of carrier, freight insurer or other provider of services originated by a
customer in the boycotting country. 33 He may not, however, comply
with boycott-based selections of export facilities other than carriers
initiated by United States persons, since to do so would risk a charge
34
of evasion or aiding and abetting.
Nothing in the EAA or its legislative history requires the result
contained in the EAR regarding selections of providers of services
necessary for conveyance of goods to boycotting countries. This is
probably so because the Congress did not realize that the Secretary
would construe the local law compliance exception not to cover
selections of providers of services, and especially those services necessary to carry out an export-import transaction.33 5 Even if the Commerce Department were to continue to resist the compelling logic
favoring amendment to the EAR to permit boycott-based selections
of providers of services, generally in compliance with local law, it
should, at a minimum, amend the EAR to permit such selections
with regard to freight insurers and other providers of services necessary in the conveyance of goods from the United States to Arab
countries. If it does not amend the EAR, the likely result will be the
establishment of freight insurance facilities by the Arab countries
themselves, and a resulting loss of business for American insurers.
d.

Import and Shipping Documentation

The consequence of the EAR's treatment of services under the
local law compliance exception is to diminish somewhat the practical benefit of this exception. These benefits are further reduced by
the EAR's apparent refusal to allow special treatment for import
and shipping documentation furnished in the context of an import
transaction carried out in compliance with local import law. 336 Thus,
firms with operations in boycotting countries are probably subject
to the same stringent limits in this respect as are United States
See notes 284 to 296 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 299 to 302 supra and accompanying text.
' See notes 308 to 309 supra and accompanying text.
" Senator Stevenson, the leading Senate sponsor of antiboycott legislation, clearly intended the local law compliance exception to cover such services. The exception, he said,
"presumably would include the services of carriers making deliveries to the boycotting country." 123 CoNG. REc. S7154 (daily ed. May 5, 1977).
'*" See notes 338 to 341 infra and accompanying text.
"'

'
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exporters."' This conclusion seems compelled by the following analyses.
The EAR's exception for activities "exclusively within" a boycotting country is probably too narrowly drafted to permit the furnishing of prohibited boycott information by a United States person
resident in a boycotting country in connection with an import transaction.3 Though it explicitly allows a boycotting country resident
to furnish otherwise prohibited boycott information to a person
within the boycotting country so long as the information is compiled
within the boycotting country and is based on the resident's own
knowledge," it does not specify precisely what is meant by the
requisite that information be compiled within the boycotting country. It is common in import transactions for data from which an
importer might compile information to be furnished to officials
within the boycotting country, that is, data about the supplier of the
imported goods, the carrier and the insurer, to originate from outside the boycotting country. Further, the examples in the subsection
suggest a narrow interpretation of what should be considered as
information compiled within the country. 40 The examples include
3 4
no case involving an import transaction. 1
The local import law compliance exception makes no reference to
342
the furnishing of information incident to the importation of goods.
Rather, the regulations and examples of the subsection emphasize
the limitations on the selection of goods by a boycotting country
resident. 43 While the issue is not free from doubt, it seems that the
exception is not meant to permit the furnishing of negative certifications or other boycott-related information, not specifically excepted
by the EAR, incident to the importation of goods.
If the EAR do not permit a boycotting country resident to supply
boycott information in compliance with local import law with regard to the importation of goods into the boycotting country, a
rather anomalous situation is created whereby a United States person is permitted to agree to and, in fact, select an import on a
prohibited boycott basis but is prohibited from actually certifying
:"7

See notes 86 to 107 supra and accompanying text which outline the prohibitions and

exceptions that apply to such documentation with regard to export transactions.
' See EAR § 369.3(f-1), 43 Fed. Reg. 3532-33 (1978).
Id. Activities Exclusively Within a Foreign Country, Examples (iii) and (iv).
I"
341)

Id.

32

Id.
EAR § 369.3(f-2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
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Id.

341
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to the boycotting country it has done so. Such an anomaly may be
more than a mere annoyance. Certifications including prohibited
boycott information will no doubt continue to be required in at least
some boycotting countries. An inability to supply such certifications
in some instances may mean that a boycotting country resident, in
fact, will not be able to import goods for his own use as contemplated in the EAA.
Unless or until the Commerce Department clarifies the EAR, a
prudent construction of them may foreclose a number of transactions otherwise permitted. Accordingly, in the spirit of the local law
compliance exception as a whole and particularly the local import
law subsection, the Department should clarify the EAR to permit
importers to supply such information (other than discriminatory
information) required for the import of goods into the boycotting
country.
e.

Letter of Credit Transactions within a Boycotting Country
Branches and subsidiaries of United States banks in boycotting
countries have in the past carried on a not insignificant number of
letter of credit transactions in these countries. Typically, a national
or resident of a boycotting country will ask such bank branches or
subsidiaries to open a letter of credit in favor of a nonboycotting
country exporter in order to provide payment for the import of goods
or services. Such letters of credit frequently contain boycott-related
conditions and requirements which would be likely to prevent a
United States bank branch or subsidiary outside the boycotting
country from implementing them with respect to transactions in
United States commerce." The possibility that a United States
bank branch or subsidiary could issue these letters of credit depends
almost entirely on the applicability of the local law compliance
exception.
As noted earlier in this Article, the local law compliance exception
permits boycotting residents including bank branches and subsidiaries to comply with the nondiscriminatory local boycott laws and
requirements with respect to activities of the residents exclusively
within the boycotting country." 5 Unfortunately, while the EAR's
3" The EAA's prohibition against implementation of letters of credit containing prohibited
boycott conditions, EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1)(F), is only applicable when the beneficiary is a
United States person and the underlying transaction is in United States commerce. See notes
196 to 199 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 269 to 275 supra and accompanying text.
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analysis of the local law compliance exception does deal rather extensively with the interpretation of the requirement that activities
to be covered thereby must be exclusively within the boycotting
country, it does not deal specifically with letters of credit.
An analysis of the activities of an issuing bank in a letter of credit
transaction suggests that such activities could certainly be considered as activities "exclusively within" the boycotting country so
long as a local bank customer opens the credit at a bank branch
within the boycotting country. In that case the bank agrees with the
local customer to issue the letter of credit with the terms and conditions specified by the customer and by the laws and regulations of
the boycotting country. The cost for opening the letter of credit is
almost always borne by the local customer. Although such a letter
of credit is issued in favor of a letter of credit beneficiary residing
outside the boycotting country, the issuing bank reviews within the
boycotting country the documents supplied in compliance with the
terms of the credit and makes its decision within the boycotting
country whether or not the credit is to be paid. Payment by the local
customer for the credit is almost invariably made locally.
On the other hand, letters of credit issued to beneficiaries outside
the country of the issuer require not insignificant services from
banks located in the country of the beneficiary. Further, payment
to the beneficiary is generally effected from funds of the issuing
bank on deposit in the country of the beneficiary.
Accordingly, the EAR should be amended to make clear whether
or not letters of credit issued by a bank branch or subsidiary in a
boycotting country to a beneficiary outside the boycotting country
come within the local law compliance exception. That the Congress
imposed upon the Commerce Department a burden to clarify the
effects of the EAA on letter of credit transactions, there can be no
doubt.34
V.

AssEsSMENTS AND

CONCLUSIONS

As noted in the Introduction, three of the most important variables in determining the results of the experiment begun by the enactment of the EAA are: the regulations adopted by the Commerce
Department to implement the EAA's prohibitions and exceptions;
the response of Arab, boycotting nations to the new United States
legal strictures; and the character of the administration and en... SENATE REPORT,

supra note 7, at 41.
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forcement of the new laws and regulations by the Commerce Department.
Sections III and IV of this Article set forth the EAA's prohibitions
and exceptions, analyzed its jurisdictional tests as amplified in the
EAR, and then assessed the application of the EAA and EAR to a
range of business relations with Arab countries. The foregoing sections made certain tacit assumptions about the likely reaction by
Arab boycotting countries to the new law. Before proceeding to a
summary assessment of the likely impact of the EAA and EAR on
United States business prospects in the Middle East and an assessment of the character of the Commerce Department's administration of these new laws, it is worthwhile to venture some observation
and speculation regarding this Arab response to the EAA.
A.

The Arab Response-A Speculative Assessment

Some United States firms have already encountered signs that
Arab customers are willing, in limited measure, to accommodate
their boycott practices to the requirements of United Statess law.
Many of the more moderate Arab nations, even prior to the January
18, 1978, effective date of the EAA's prohibitions, relaxed requirements for negative certificates of origin of goods and began accepting in their place affirmative statements of the origin of goods. Also,
a number of United States concerns were sent boycott questionnaires immediately prior to the EAR's effective date, possibly indicating an awareness by boycott authorities that such firms would
not, as a general matter, be able to answer such questionnaires after
January 18, 1978. Some firms with operations in both the United
States and Europe have found that in exporting goods from Europe
they encounter more stringent boycott demands than when exporting from the United States. This may be a sign of willingness on the
part of some Arab states to take United States legal requirements
into account. On the other hand, the harder line Arab countries, and
especially Iraq, have shown few, if any, signs of flexibility.
The flexibility that has been shown by Arab countries has related
principally to form and not substance. An affirmative certificate of
origin can, of course, serve the same end as one negatively phrased.
Nevertheless, the willingness of many Arab countries to adjust form
to accommodate United States law augurs well for the possible success of the experiment initiated by the EAA. At the same time,
however, there exists no evidence that Arab boycotting countries
will, as a general rule, abandon the substance of their boycott of
Israel in the case of most business transactions. As has been true in
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the past, depending upon the nature of United States business's
product or service, it will remain possible on a transaction-bytransaction basis to negotiate the deletion or amendment of boycott
requirements.
B.

Summary of Likely Business Impacts

Based upon these speculative assessments of Arab conduct, the
following summary conclusions can be stated regarding the likely
overall impact of the EAA's provisions, as implemented by the
EAR, on American business relations in and with Arab countries:
1. United States exporters, including their controlled in
fact foreign subsidiaries and branches when a United States
commerce nexus exists, will be seriously circumscribed in
the types of boycott information they can provide3 ' and in
the types of boycott agreements they can enter. The impact
of these limitations on action may be, in considerable measure, mitigated by the willingness of Arab moderates to accept qualifying affirmative certifications and contractual
undertakings. Business will be lost, however, especially in
hardline countries.
2. Arab countries, at least the more moderate ones, will
probably bend to the EAR's prohibition on furnishing information as to the blacklist status of carriers and insurers. As
noted above, the EAR permit exporters to furnish positive
certificates as to the names of insurers and carriers and such
permitted certifications should still enable Arab countries to
effectively administer the boycott. However, for convenience
sake, in an effort to foster local industry and perhaps in a
pique at the EAA and EAR requirements, Arab nations are
apt to increase selections of national or other Arab carriers
and insurers with attendant loss of business for United
States carriers and insurers.
3. While hardline Arab nations will not stop purchasing
United States goods altogether, particularly those goods
needed for national development, they may well as a matter
of national policy favor European and Japanese goods of
similar type and quality.
4. The EAA's sweeping prohibition on furnishing information, as broadly interpreted by the Commerce Department,
3,7The full effect of the documentation limitations is not yet known because of the "mini"
grace period until June 21, 1978. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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may pose a substantial obstacle to United States firms seeking to avert blacklisting or removal from the blacklist. It
may, itself, lead to increased blacklisting of United States
firms unable to provide information to correct frequent Arab
misconceptions. This provision itself, however, may not have
too serious an impact on the development of new business
opportunities in Arab countries because of the availability of
the local law compliance exception and the EAR's interpretation of it allowing the furnishing of boycott information for
the purpose of establishing residence.
5. The EAA's prohibition on refusals to do business, as
counterbalanced by its exceptions and especially those allowing compliance with unilateral and specific selection and
compliance with local import law, will hamper but not prevent business in the Middle East. When the exceptions are
not available or applicable, firms may require goods to be
delivered and for title to pass "in country." This same concept possibly may also be applied in the selection of providers of services although the EAR are not clear on this point.
6. The EAA's evasion provision will constrain conduct
which might otherwise circumvent the EAA's prohibitions.
In addition, because of its broad terms, it may continue to
cause uncertainty and delay, and consequent competitive
detriment to United States firms, in business decision making with regard to opportunities arising in Middle Eastern
markets.
7. The overall effect of the EAA on letter of credit operations is difficult to assess with any precision for it depends
to a large degree on the willingness of Arab countries to
accept qualifying, affirmative import and shipping documentation. It does seem fair to conclude that the EAA and
EAR have injected new and unwanted complexity into the
letter of credit business with almost certain increased costs
to banks and exporters alike. Depending on the resolution of
these complexities, letter of credit transactions may diminish.
8. United States firms with operations in boycotting countries may take advantage of the EAA and EAR's deference
to the exercise of sovereignty by Arab States. However, here
again, great regulatory complexity has been imposed, and
this will handicap such operations, especially in relation to
those of foreign competitors.
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9. If the EAR cannot be clearly and precisely described,
more moderate Arab states in attempting to alter rules or
regulations and form agreements that will accommodate the
EAR, will, not infrequently, unintentionally make changes
that continue to place United States persons in jeopardy.
10. The Commerce Department's construction of the
EAA's anti-evasion provision prohibiting United States exporters to sell to Arab countries through bona fide foreign
distributors able to make boycott certifications and agreements will cause United States concerns to establish or enlarge wholly foreign manufacturing subsidiaries with an attendant loss or "export" of American jobs.
C. The Penalty of Imprecision-The Need for Interpretive
Procedures
Possibly more consequential than the direct effects of the EAA's
prohibitions and exceptions as implemented by the EAR are their
indirect effects resulting from the great complexity they impose on
business decision making. Stated another way, the new law and
regulations may seriously handicap American firms and their foreign branches and affiliates not simply because of their direct proscriptions but rather because it is so difficult to apply these standards confidently to the facts of individual transactions to determine whether or not a business decision will result in jeopardy of
civil or criminal penalties. In largest measure, this burden of complexity is not the fault of the Commerce Department. It is the direct
result of the legislative scheme itself, posing as it does three jurisdictional threshold tests, six prohibitions, six exceptions and a broad
injunction against evasion, all of which must be applied in the analysis of the facts of any given business transaction.
It is true, as has been extensively discussed in section IV, that
the EAR contain significant gaps and imperfections. Nevertheless,
the Commerce Department's regulations represent a conscientious
effort to give specific content to a very complex statutory scheme.
Even if the majority of the EAR's imperfections were to be remedied, the American businessman would still face great regulatory
34
complexity in his business dealings in the Middle East. 1
This burden of complexity could be significantly lessened if the
3,1 This complexity is seriously compounded by the antiboycott provisions of the TRA. See
note 5 supra.
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Commerce Departmeni were to adopt a flexible and responsive system for providing interpretive advice in the context of specific transactions. The Department, to date, has failed to establish such a
system. It has proposed a system for providing interpretive rulings
pursuant to requests raising important issues of general interest.",
Responses to requests for interpretations under this system are entirely discretionary with the Department. 0 The system offers no
genuine prospects that affected parties may secure timely,
transaction-specific advice. Such a system for interpretive or nonaction advice is a virtual prerequisite to a regulatory program of the
complexity that marks the EAA and EAR. Unless or until the Department of Commerce establishes such a system, the EAA and
EAR may handicap American businessmen by the uncertainties
they create more than by the prohibitions they contain.
D. Conclusion
The experiment begun by enactment of the EAA may some day
be analyzed by historians as an apogee of the regulatory optimism
of 20th century America. The Congress and the President have
acted upon moral impulse to regulate, in sweeping fashion, commercial dealings of United States firms and numerous foreign entities
controlled by these firms. Their action was tempered by a pragmatism which itself was as American as the moral impulse behind the
legislation. This pragmatism manifests itself in the EAA's exceptions. The distillate of this mix of morality and pragmatism is complexity and uncertainty.
The EAA was enacted after long-drawn and spirited controversy
regarding the appropriate scope of the United States response to the
3142 Fed. Reg. 65,592, 65,595 (1977). Also, under the proposed procedures for issuance of
interpretive letters, the requesting party must identify "all relevant parties" including himself. Id. The Commerce Department is without adequate, statutory authority to withhold the
names of individuals requesting such letters from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (1976). American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, No. 76-1559 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). Given the intensity of public interest in the conduct of United States businesses
in response to the Arab boycott of Israel and the potential business consequences which could
attend disclosure of the name of a party initiating a request, companies will be reluctant to
initiate requests for interpretive letters unless some means is designed to guarantee the
requestor anonymity. The only apparent means to guarantee such anonymity would be to
permit requests for interpretive letters to be submitted in hypothetical terms and forwarded
to the Department by counsel or other third party on behalf of the requesting party. The
Department's interpretive opinion would bind the Department only with regard to the precise
facts set forth in the request.
42 Fed. Reg. 65,592, 65,595 (1977).
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Arab boycott of Israel. The compromises which underly the EAA
were reached in a spirit of moderation. It can only be hoped at this
time that the spirit of moderation will continue to prevail in the
Commerce Department, in the Congress, in Arab countries, and in
the business community. With continued great patience by all parties, and with the establishment of better means for securing specific interpretive advice regarding the application of the EAA and
EAR to particular circumstances, the experiment may achieve a
measure of success.

